https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 23:36:43 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368253 EUVD-2026-368253 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368253 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82430 <p>Description</p> <p>When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.</p> <p>For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`, `--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.</p> <p>For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant&#39;s uid.</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open, and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.</p> <p>Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI wor…</p> <p>Description</p> <p>When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.</p> <p>For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`, `--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.</p> <p>For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant&#39;s uid.</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open, and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.</p> <p>Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI wor…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82430 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pjcp-2m43-fmv9 <p>Description</p> <p>When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.</p> <p>For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`, `--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.</p> <p>For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant&#39;s uid.</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open, and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.</p> <p>Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI wor…</p> <p>Description</p> <p>When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.</p> <p>For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`, `--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.</p> <p>For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant&#39;s uid.</p> <p>Mitigation</p> <p>Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open, and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.</p> <p>Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI wor…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pjcp-2m43-fmv9