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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-363298</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363298</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-363298</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-363298</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-82404</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82404</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;TOON is a compact, human-readable serialization of JSON data for LLM prompts. Prior to 2.3.1, decoding attacker-controlled TOON with a __proto__, constructor, or prototype key wrote through the object prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting Object.prototype for the runtime. In packages/toon/src/decode/expand.ts, the expandPaths: &amp;#39;safe&amp;#39; path and insertPathSafe function made dotted keys such as a.__proto__.x the strongest vector, while plain nested objects, tabular rows, quoted keys, and streaming decode were also affected. The encoder also dropped own __proto__ properties and could invoke an inherited setter during normalization. Services that decode untrusted TOON could experience denial of service or, when a suitable downstream gadget is present, remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;TOON is a compact, human-readable serialization of JSON data for LLM prompts. Prior to 2.3.1, decoding attacker-controlled TOON with a __proto__, constructor, or prototype key wrote through the object prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting Object.prototype for the runtime. In packages/toon/src/decode/expand.ts, the expandPaths: &amp;#39;safe&amp;#39; path and insertPathSafe function made dotted keys such as a.__proto__.x the strongest vector, while plain nested objects, tabular rows, quoted keys, and streaming decode were also affected. The encoder also dropped own __proto__ properties and could invoke an inherited setter during normalization. Services that decode untrusted TOON could experience denial of service or, when a suitable downstream gadget is present, remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82404</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-p95v-992w-h6c3 — TOON: Prototype pollution when decoding untrusted TOON input</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p95v-992w-h6c3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @toon-format/toon&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decoding attacker-controlled TOON containing a `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` key wrote through the object&amp;#39;s prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting `Object.prototype` for the whole runtime. The `expandPaths: &amp;#39;safe&amp;#39;` path (dotted keys such as `a.__proto__.x`) was the strongest vector; plain nested objects, tabular rows, and quoted keys were all affected. The encoder had a matching defect: it silently dropped own `__proto__` properties and could fire an inherited setter while normalizing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any service that decodes untrusted TOON is affected. Prototype pollution can escalate to denial of service or, with a suitable downstream gadget, remote code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `@toon-format/toon@2.3.1`. Decoders now materialize `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` as ordinary own data properties, matching `JSON.parse` semantics; the encoder preserves the same keys without invoking inherited accessors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None. Upgrade is the only fix. Callers who cannot upgrade should reject input whose keys include `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` before decoding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Port maintainers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same bug shape can exist in any implementation that assigns decoded keys with `obj[key] = value`. Rust, Swift, Java, Python, and C# ports should audit their object-construction and path-expansion paths for the three prototype keys.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @toon-format/toon&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Decoding attacker-controlled TOON containing a `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` key wrote through the object&amp;#39;s prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting `Object.prototype` for the whole runtime. The `expandPaths: &amp;#39;safe&amp;#39;` path (dotted keys such as `a.__proto__.x`) was the strongest vector; plain nested objects, tabular rows, and quoted keys were all affected. The encoder had a matching defect: it silently dropped own `__proto__` properties and could fire an inherited setter while normalizing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any service that decodes untrusted TOON is affected. Prototype pollution can escalate to denial of service or, with a suitable downstream gadget, remote code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to `@toon-format/toon@2.3.1`. Decoders now materialize `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` as ordinary own data properties, matching `JSON.parse` semantics; the encoder preserves the same keys without invoking inherited accessors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None. Upgrade is the only fix. Callers who cannot upgrade should reject input whose keys include `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` before decoding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Port maintainers&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same bug shape can exist in any implementation that assigns decoded keys with `obj[key] = value`. Rust, Swift, Java, Python, and C# ports should audit their object-construction and path-expansion paths for the three prototype keys.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p95v-992w-h6c3</guid>
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