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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-374934</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-374934</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-374934</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-374934</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-80208</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80208</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 annotates both getUserHistories and closePausedUserAccount in InternalUserController with requiredLogin = false. ResourceInterceptor honours that annotation by returning before any session or API key is validated, and the nginx gateway shipped with the product proxies every /api request to the backend server, so both endpoints are reachable by any unauthenticated client that can reach the gateway. An attacker can POST to /api/v1/internal/getUserHistories to enumerate the accounts sitting in the 30-day cooling-off period that follows a deletion request, then POST to /api/v1/internal/users/{userId}/close for each one. The closure path clears the account&amp;#39;s email address, phone number and nickname, cancels its space subscriptions, removes its space memberships and deletes its OAuth bindings, so the cooling-off window that exists to let a user reverse a deletion request is bypassed and the account cannot be recovered.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 annotates both getUserHistories and closePausedUserAccount in InternalUserController with requiredLogin = false. ResourceInterceptor honours that annotation by returning before any session or API key is validated, and the nginx gateway shipped with the product proxies every /api request to the backend server, so both endpoints are reachable by any unauthenticated client that can reach the gateway. An attacker can POST to /api/v1/internal/getUserHistories to enumerate the accounts sitting in the 30-day cooling-off period that follows a deletion request, then POST to /api/v1/internal/users/{userId}/close for each one. The closure path clears the account&amp;#39;s email address, phone number and nickname, cancels its space subscriptions, removes its space memberships and deletes its OAuth bindings, so the cooling-off window that exists to let a user reverse a deletion request is bypassed and the account cannot be recovered.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-80208</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-84jw-g3q8-wfgq</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-84jw-g3q8-wfgq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 annotates both getUserHistories and closePausedUserAccount in InternalUserController with requiredLogin = false. ResourceInterceptor honours that annotation by returning before any session or API key is validated, and the nginx gateway shipped with the product proxies every /api request to the backend server, so both endpoints are reachable by any unauthenticated client that can reach the gateway. An attacker can POST to /api/v1/internal/getUserHistories to enumerate the accounts sitting in the 30-day cooling-off period that follows a deletion request, then POST to /api/v1/internal/users/{userId}/close for each one. The closure path clears the account&amp;#39;s email address, phone number and nickname, cancels its space subscriptions, removes its space memberships and deletes its OAuth bindings, so the cooling-off window that exists to let a user reverse a deletion request is bypassed and the account cannot be recovered.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;APITable through 1.13.0-beta.1 annotates both getUserHistories and closePausedUserAccount in InternalUserController with requiredLogin = false. ResourceInterceptor honours that annotation by returning before any session or API key is validated, and the nginx gateway shipped with the product proxies every /api request to the backend server, so both endpoints are reachable by any unauthenticated client that can reach the gateway. An attacker can POST to /api/v1/internal/getUserHistories to enumerate the accounts sitting in the 30-day cooling-off period that follows a deletion request, then POST to /api/v1/internal/users/{userId}/close for each one. The closure path clears the account&amp;#39;s email address, phone number and nickname, cancels its space subscriptions, removes its space memberships and deletes its OAuth bindings, so the cooling-off window that exists to let a user reverse a deletion request is bypassed and the account cannot be recovered.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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