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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-358373</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358373</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-358373</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358373</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-78551</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-78551</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;RansomLook contains multiple weaknesses in its authentication endpoint that allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate valid usernames, perform unrestricted password-guessing attacks, and potentially exhaust application worker resources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For local authentication, the login implementation previously checked whether a submitted username existed before invoking the password hash verification function. Requests containing a nonexistent username therefore returned significantly faster than requests for valid accounts, for which the computationally expensive password verification routine was executed. A remote attacker could measure these response-time differences to determine which usernames correspond to valid RansomLook accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition, the /login endpoint did not restrict the number or frequency of failed authentication attempts. An attacker could consequently perform password brute-force, dictionary, password-spraying, or credential-stuffing attacks against known accounts without server-side throttling. For valid usernames, each authentication attempt also invokes the password key-derivation function, which consumes a significant amount of CPU time. A sufficiently high rate of login attempts could therefore occupy the application&amp;#39;s synchronous Gunicorn workers and cause a denial of service affecting the entire application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue has been addressed by always performing password verification using a randomly generated dummy password hash when the supplie…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;RansomLook contains multiple weaknesses in its authentication endpoint that allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate valid usernames, perform unrestricted password-guessing attacks, and potentially exhaust application worker resources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For local authentication, the login implementation previously checked whether a submitted username existed before invoking the password hash verification function. Requests containing a nonexistent username therefore returned significantly faster than requests for valid accounts, for which the computationally expensive password verification routine was executed. A remote attacker could measure these response-time differences to determine which usernames correspond to valid RansomLook accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition, the /login endpoint did not restrict the number or frequency of failed authentication attempts. An attacker could consequently perform password brute-force, dictionary, password-spraying, or credential-stuffing attacks against known accounts without server-side throttling. For valid usernames, each authentication attempt also invokes the password key-derivation function, which consumes a significant amount of CPU time. A sufficiently high rate of login attempts could therefore occupy the application&amp;#39;s synchronous Gunicorn workers and cause a denial of service affecting the entire application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue has been addressed by always performing password verification using a randomly generated dummy password hash when the supplie…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-78551</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vrw5-9j4x-chw5</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vrw5-9j4x-chw5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;RansomLook contains multiple weaknesses in its authentication endpoint that allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate valid usernames, perform unrestricted password-guessing attacks, and potentially exhaust application worker resources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For local authentication, the login implementation previously checked whether a submitted username existed before invoking the password hash verification function. Requests containing a nonexistent username therefore returned significantly faster than requests for valid accounts, for which the computationally expensive password verification routine was executed. A remote attacker could measure these response-time differences to determine which usernames correspond to valid RansomLook accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition, the /login endpoint did not restrict the number or frequency of failed authentication attempts. An attacker could consequently perform password brute-force, dictionary, password-spraying, or credential-stuffing attacks against known accounts without server-side throttling. For valid usernames, each authentication attempt also invokes the password key-derivation function, which consumes a significant amount of CPU time. A sufficiently high rate of login attempts could therefore occupy the application&amp;#39;s synchronous Gunicorn workers and cause a denial of service affecting the entire application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue has been addressed by always performing password verification using a randomly generated dummy password hash when the supplie…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;RansomLook contains multiple weaknesses in its authentication endpoint that allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate valid usernames, perform unrestricted password-guessing attacks, and potentially exhaust application worker resources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For local authentication, the login implementation previously checked whether a submitted username existed before invoking the password hash verification function. Requests containing a nonexistent username therefore returned significantly faster than requests for valid accounts, for which the computationally expensive password verification routine was executed. A remote attacker could measure these response-time differences to determine which usernames correspond to valid RansomLook accounts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition, the /login endpoint did not restrict the number or frequency of failed authentication attempts. An attacker could consequently perform password brute-force, dictionary, password-spraying, or credential-stuffing attacks against known accounts without server-side throttling. For valid usernames, each authentication attempt also invokes the password key-derivation function, which consumes a significant amount of CPU time. A sufficiently high rate of login attempts could therefore occupy the application&amp;#39;s synchronous Gunicorn workers and cause a denial of service affecting the entire application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue has been addressed by always performing password verification using a randomly generated dummy password hash when the supplie…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vrw5-9j4x-chw5</guid>
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