https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 12:11:02 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357954 EUVD-2026-357954 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-357954 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77812 <p>DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone&#39;s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone&#39;s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.</p> <p>* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone&#39;s network * The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices. * The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely * The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed * A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed</p> <p>Affected models are…</p> <p>DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone&#39;s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone&#39;s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.</p> <p>* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone&#39;s network * The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices. * The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely * The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed * A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed</p> <p>Affected models are…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77812 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gh7r-589j-33x7 <p>DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone&#39;s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone&#39;s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.</p> <p>* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone&#39;s network * The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices. * The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely * The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed * A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed</p> <p>Affected models are…</p> <p>DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone&#39;s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone&#39;s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.</p> <p>* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone&#39;s network * The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices. * The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely * The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed * A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed</p> <p>Affected models are…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gh7r-589j-33x7