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      <title>EUVD-2026-374928</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-374928</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-374928</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-374928</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-77763</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77763</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The filestore backend in pkg/object/file.go, used for file:// stores and as a common juicefs sync destination, derived every operation&amp;#39;s target from path(key), which returned either filepath.Join(d.root, key) or filepath.Clean(d.root + key) with no check that the result stayed beneath the root. Put, Get, Head, Delete, Chmod, Chown, Symlink and Readlink all consumed that value directly. Object keys enumerated from a source object store during a sync are not constrained the way local filesystem names are, so a key containing traversal segments causes juicefs to write attacker-supplied content to a path outside the intended local destination, and no error is returned. An operator syncing from a bucket whose contents they do not fully control, such as a shared or public bucket or one an attacker can write to, is therefore exposed to a file write at an attacker-influenced location. The fix changes path() to return an error and rejects any key whose resolved path escapes the root.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The filestore backend in pkg/object/file.go, used for file:// stores and as a common juicefs sync destination, derived every operation&amp;#39;s target from path(key), which returned either filepath.Join(d.root, key) or filepath.Clean(d.root + key) with no check that the result stayed beneath the root. Put, Get, Head, Delete, Chmod, Chown, Symlink and Readlink all consumed that value directly. Object keys enumerated from a source object store during a sync are not constrained the way local filesystem names are, so a key containing traversal segments causes juicefs to write attacker-supplied content to a path outside the intended local destination, and no error is returned. An operator syncing from a bucket whose contents they do not fully control, such as a shared or public bucket or one an attacker can write to, is therefore exposed to a file write at an attacker-influenced location. The fix changes path() to return an error and rejects any key whose resolved path escapes the root.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77763</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-2pgv-c2r7-f43r</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2pgv-c2r7-f43r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The filestore backend in pkg/object/file.go, used for file:// stores and as a common juicefs sync destination, derived every operation&amp;#39;s target from path(key), which returned either filepath.Join(d.root, key) or filepath.Clean(d.root + key) with no check that the result stayed beneath the root. Put, Get, Head, Delete, Chmod, Chown, Symlink and Readlink all consumed that value directly. Object keys enumerated from a source object store during a sync are not constrained the way local filesystem names are, so a key containing traversal segments causes juicefs to write attacker-supplied content to a path outside the intended local destination, and no error is returned. An operator syncing from a bucket whose contents they do not fully control, such as a shared or public bucket or one an attacker can write to, is therefore exposed to a file write at an attacker-influenced location. The fix changes path() to return an error and rejects any key whose resolved path escapes the root.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The filestore backend in pkg/object/file.go, used for file:// stores and as a common juicefs sync destination, derived every operation&amp;#39;s target from path(key), which returned either filepath.Join(d.root, key) or filepath.Clean(d.root + key) with no check that the result stayed beneath the root. Put, Get, Head, Delete, Chmod, Chown, Symlink and Readlink all consumed that value directly. Object keys enumerated from a source object store during a sync are not constrained the way local filesystem names are, so a key containing traversal segments causes juicefs to write attacker-supplied content to a path outside the intended local destination, and no error is returned. An operator syncing from a bucket whose contents they do not fully control, such as a shared or public bucket or one an attacker can write to, is therefore exposed to a file write at an attacker-influenced location. The fix changes path() to return an error and rejects any key whose resolved path escapes the root.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2pgv-c2r7-f43r</guid>
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