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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:15:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-409040</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409040</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-409040</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409040</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-76818</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76818</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Axon is an agent-agnostic context engine that gives AI coding agents continuous memory across sessions, tools, and machines. Prior to 0.1.1, rtk-install in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py uses _http_download() to fetch a prebuilt rtkx release archive and _extract_binary() to mark it executable, after which compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it without verifying a checksum, signature, or build attestation. If the sammyjdev/rtkx release pipeline or maintainer release credentials are compromised, an attacker can supply a modified binary that executes with the Axon process privileges when a user installs or automatically bootstraps rtkx. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Axon is an agent-agnostic context engine that gives AI coding agents continuous memory across sessions, tools, and machines. Prior to 0.1.1, rtk-install in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py uses _http_download() to fetch a prebuilt rtkx release archive and _extract_binary() to mark it executable, after which compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it without verifying a checksum, signature, or build attestation. If the sammyjdev/rtkx release pipeline or maintainer release credentials are compromised, an attacker can supply a modified binary that executes with the Axon process privileges when a user installs or automatically bootstraps rtkx. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76818</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7 — Axon: Download of Code Without Integrity Check in axon-mcp</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r7wg-f7r2-8wf7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: axon-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk — no hash comparison against any published value.
- _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.
- There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The binary is not dead code — it&amp;#39;s on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`
result = subprocess.run(
    [path, &amp;#34;read&amp;#34;, str(tmp_path)],
    capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds,
)`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: axon-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
axon rtk-install downloads a pre-built rtkx binary from GitHub releases and executes it via subprocess.run() on every text-compression call, without verifying its integrity — no checksum, signature, or attestation check anywhere in the download/install path. If the release pipeline or a maintainer token for sammyjdev/rtkx were ever compromised, every axon user who installs or auto-bootstraps rtkx would silently download and execute an unverified binary with the same privileges as the axon process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The download path lives in src/axon/context/rtk_bootstrap.py:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- _http_download() fetches the release archive over HTTPS via urllib.request.urlopen() and writes the raw response bytes to disk — no hash comparison against any published value.
- _extract_binary() unpacks the archive (zip/tar.gz) and sets the executable bit (out.chmod(... S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)), again with no verification step.
- There is no reference to checksum, sha256, verify, signature, gpg, cosign, or sigstore anywhere in this file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The binary is not dead code — it&amp;#39;s on the active execution path. src/axon/context/rtk.py::rtk_binary_path() resolves to the bootstrapped binary at ~/.axon/bin/rtkx, and compress_text_with_rtk() invokes it directly:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`
result = subprocess.run(
    [path, &amp;#34;read&amp;#34;, str(tmp_path)],
    capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_seconds,
)`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
This is a missing-control finding rather than an active exploit, so reproduction is by code audit rather…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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