<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 19:45:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-408975</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408975</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-408975</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408975</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-76807</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76807</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Todoist MCP Server provides tools that allow AI agents to access and modify a Todoist account. Prior to 10.3.3, the optional todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin requests to POST /mcp without validating the Host and Origin headers or authenticating the browser caller. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to reach the loopback listener and invoke MCP tools through StreamableHTTPServerTransport, which uses the server-held Todoist API key. This exposes Todoist account data and permits operations such as task creation, updates, completion, and deletion. The stdio transport is not browser-reachable and is not affected by this attack path. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Todoist MCP Server provides tools that allow AI agents to access and modify a Todoist account. Prior to 10.3.3, the optional todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin requests to POST /mcp without validating the Host and Origin headers or authenticating the browser caller. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to reach the loopback listener and invoke MCP tools through StreamableHTTPServerTransport, which uses the server-held Todoist API key. This exposes Todoist account data and permits operations such as task creation, updates, completion, and deletion. The stdio transport is not browser-reachable and is not affected by this attack path. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76807</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-833v-v58w-294h — Todoist MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding lets websites write and delete Todoist data through local MCP server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-833v-v58w-294h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @doist/todoist-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The self-hosted `todoist-mcp-http` server accepts browser-origin MCP requests with attacker-controlled `Host` and `Origin` headers. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to route its own origin to a victim&amp;#39;s local `127.0.0.1` MCP server, then invoke Todoist MCP tools without a caller credential.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects `github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp` at commit `d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f`, package version `10.3.1`, when the optional Streamable HTTP server is running. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable. The vulnerable browser-reachable component is `todoist-mcp-http`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The documented HTTP server mode runs all MCP tools with the operator&amp;#39;s `TODOIST_API_KEY` and binds to loopback by default:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
TODOIST_API_KEY=your-key npx -p @doist/todoist-mcp todoist-mcp-http
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/main-http.ts:28-30` sets the HTTP bind host and port:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const PORT = Number.parseInt(process.env.PORT || &amp;#39;3000&amp;#39;, 10)
const HOST = process.env.HOST || &amp;#39;127.0.0.1&amp;#39;
const LISTEN_HOST = normalizeListenHost(HOST)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/main-http.ts:88-99` dispatches `POST /mcp` to `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` without validating `Host` or `Origin`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
app.post(
    &amp;#39;/mcp&amp;#39;,
    requireValidTodoistToken({ type: &amp;#39;static&amp;#39;, apiKey: todoistApiKey, baseUrl }),
    async (req: Request, res: Response) =&amp;gt; {
        const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
            sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
        })&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const server = getMcpServer({ todoistApiKey, baseUrl })
        await serve…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @doist/todoist-mcp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The self-hosted `todoist-mcp-http` server accepts browser-origin MCP requests with attacker-controlled `Host` and `Origin` headers. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to route its own origin to a victim&amp;#39;s local `127.0.0.1` MCP server, then invoke Todoist MCP tools without a caller credential.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects `github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp` at commit `d2903e0d945d2a559d71c091337ad6380511e62f`, package version `10.3.1`, when the optional Streamable HTTP server is running. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable. The vulnerable browser-reachable component is `todoist-mcp-http`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The documented HTTP server mode runs all MCP tools with the operator&amp;#39;s `TODOIST_API_KEY` and binds to loopback by default:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
TODOIST_API_KEY=your-key npx -p @doist/todoist-mcp todoist-mcp-http
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/main-http.ts:28-30` sets the HTTP bind host and port:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const PORT = Number.parseInt(process.env.PORT || &amp;#39;3000&amp;#39;, 10)
const HOST = process.env.HOST || &amp;#39;127.0.0.1&amp;#39;
const LISTEN_HOST = normalizeListenHost(HOST)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/main-http.ts:88-99` dispatches `POST /mcp` to `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` without validating `Host` or `Origin`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
app.post(
    &amp;#39;/mcp&amp;#39;,
    requireValidTodoistToken({ type: &amp;#39;static&amp;#39;, apiKey: todoistApiKey, baseUrl }),
    async (req: Request, res: Response) =&amp;gt; {
        const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
            sessionIdGenerator: undefined,
        })&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const server = getMcpServer({ todoistApiKey, baseUrl })
        await serve…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-833v-v58w-294h</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
