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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 03:18:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-373722</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373722</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-373722</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-373722</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-76802</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76802</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Nuclei is a vulnerability scanner built on a simple YAML-based DSL. From 3.0.0 until 3.10.0, the DAST template loading branch does not apply the unsigned code-template signature check before accepting a template that contains both a fuzzing: block and an unsigned code: block. When an operator enables -dast, an untrusted multiprotocol template can place an unsigned code request into the execution queue and run arbitrary shell commands even without -code or a valid cryptographic signature. The issue affects CLI DAST scans and SDK integrations that enable DAST while accepting attacker-supplied templates. This issue is fixed in version 3.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Nuclei is a vulnerability scanner built on a simple YAML-based DSL. From 3.0.0 until 3.10.0, the DAST template loading branch does not apply the unsigned code-template signature check before accepting a template that contains both a fuzzing: block and an unsigned code: block. When an operator enables -dast, an untrusted multiprotocol template can place an unsigned code request into the execution queue and run arbitrary shell commands even without -code or a valid cryptographic signature. The issue affects CLI DAST scans and SDK integrations that enable DAST while accepting attacker-supplied templates. This issue is fixed in version 3.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76802</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jpf4-98qj-qr67 — Nuclei: Arbitrary Command Execution via DAST Code Signature Bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jpf4-98qj-qr67</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in Nuclei&amp;#39;s DAST template loading path allows unsigned `code:` protocol templates to execute, bypassing the cryptographic signature requirement that is meant to prevent arbitrary command execution from untrusted templates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected Component**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in the template loader&amp;#39;s DAST loading branch. When `-dast` is enabled and a template contains a `fuzzing:` block, the loader accepted the template through a code path that omitted the unsigned-code-template signature check present in the normal loading branch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Description**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nuclei requires `code:` protocol templates to be cryptographically signed before execution. Unsigned code templates are normally skipped with a warning. However, when a template combined a `fuzzing:` block (making it DAST-eligible) with an unsigned `code:` block, enabling `-dast` routed the template through the DAST loader branch, which did not enforce signature verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For multiprotocol templates containing both HTTP and `code:` blocks, the unsigned code request was included in the execution queue regardless of whether `-code` was set. This allowed arbitrary shell command execution from an unsigned `code:` block with only `-dast` enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
Both DAST mode (`-dast`) and code-protocol templates are disabled by default. Code templates normally require both the `-code` flag and a valid template signature. This issue bypassed the signature and `-code` controls only when `-dast` was explicitly enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected User…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in Nuclei&amp;#39;s DAST template loading path allows unsigned `code:` protocol templates to execute, bypassing the cryptographic signature requirement that is meant to prevent arbitrary command execution from untrusted templates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected Component**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is in the template loader&amp;#39;s DAST loading branch. When `-dast` is enabled and a template contains a `fuzzing:` block, the loader accepted the template through a code path that omitted the unsigned-code-template signature check present in the normal loading branch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Description**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nuclei requires `code:` protocol templates to be cryptographically signed before execution. Unsigned code templates are normally skipped with a warning. However, when a template combined a `fuzzing:` block (making it DAST-eligible) with an unsigned `code:` block, enabling `-dast` routed the template through the DAST loader branch, which did not enforce signature verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For multiprotocol templates containing both HTTP and `code:` blocks, the unsigned code request was included in the execution queue regardless of whether `-code` was set. This allowed arbitrary shell command execution from an unsigned `code:` block with only `-dast` enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
Both DAST mode (`-dast`) and code-protocol templates are disabled by default. Code templates normally require both the `-code` flag and a valid template signature. This issue bypassed the signature and `-code` controls only when `-dast` was explicitly enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected User…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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