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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-372427</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372427</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-372427</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-372427</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-75513</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75513</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Marten is a .NET Transactional Document DB and Event Store on PostgreSQL. From version 7.0.0 until 9.13.0, several Marten LINQ and tenant-management paths interpolate runtime, potentially attacker-controlled strings into single-quoted SQL literals without escaping or parameterization. The primary confirmed vector is a dictionary indexer key used by Where filters in src/Marten/Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryItemMember.cs. Additional affected sinks include SelectParser.cs, DatabaseScopedTenantPartitions.cs, and DeleteAllForTenant.cs reached through IEventStore.DeleteProjectionProgressAsync, while DictionaryContainsKeyFilter.cs (Newtonsoft serializer only; System.Text.Json is not affected) handles ContainsKey calls. Events/Daemon/Internals/EventLoader.cs contains a related per-tenant partition-pruning literal that the advisory identifies as a defense-in-depth sink. A crafted single quote can escape the generated literal, enabling filter or multi-tenant authorization bypass and blind data exfiltration, and deployments that permit semicolon-batched Npgsql statements may also allow data modification. This issue is fixed in version 9.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Marten is a .NET Transactional Document DB and Event Store on PostgreSQL. From version 7.0.0 until 9.13.0, several Marten LINQ and tenant-management paths interpolate runtime, potentially attacker-controlled strings into single-quoted SQL literals without escaping or parameterization. The primary confirmed vector is a dictionary indexer key used by Where filters in src/Marten/Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryItemMember.cs. Additional affected sinks include SelectParser.cs, DatabaseScopedTenantPartitions.cs, and DeleteAllForTenant.cs reached through IEventStore.DeleteProjectionProgressAsync, while DictionaryContainsKeyFilter.cs (Newtonsoft serializer only; System.Text.Json is not affected) handles ContainsKey calls. Events/Daemon/Internals/EventLoader.cs contains a related per-tenant partition-pruning literal that the advisory identifies as a defense-in-depth sink. A crafted single quote can escape the generated literal, enabling filter or multi-tenant authorization bypass and blind data exfiltration, and deployments that permit semicolon-batched Npgsql statements may also allow data modification. This issue is fixed in version 9.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75513</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rfx3-98h7-v3xp — Marten's LINQ provider has SQL injection via unescaped string literals</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rfx3-98h7-v3xp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Marten&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several code paths in Marten&amp;#39;s LINQ provider and tenant-management internals interpolated a runtime, potentially attacker-influenced value into generated SQL as a single-quoted string literal without escaping or parameterization. A value containing a single quote (`&amp;#39;`) could break out of the literal and inject arbitrary SQL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The primary vector is a `Dictionary&amp;lt;,&amp;gt;` indexer **key** used in a `Where` filter — `Where(x =&amp;gt; x.Attributes[key] == v)` — a common &amp;#34;filter by attribute name&amp;#34; / EAV pattern. It is confirmed with an executed proof-of-concept and yields filter / multi-tenant authorization bypass (returning other tenants&amp;#39; rows) and blind data exfiltration. Where the application permits `;`-batched statements (Npgsql default), data modification is also possible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected sinks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryItemMember.cs` — dictionary indexer key (primary, confirmed PoC)
- `Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryContainsKeyFilter.cs` — `Dictionary.ContainsKey(key)` (Newtonsoft serializer only; System.Text.Json escapes the quote)
- `Linq/Parsing/SelectParser.cs` — a constant string projected through `Select(x =&amp;gt; new { L = runtimeString })`
- `Internal/Operations/DeleteAllForTenant.cs` — tenant id reaching per-tenant projection teardown via `IEventStore.DeleteProjectionProgressAsync` (an in-code comment wrongly claimed the value was validated)
- `Schema/DatabaseScopedTenantPartitions.cs` — tenant id inlined into `FOR VALUES IN (&amp;#39;...&amp;#39;)` partition DDL
- `Events/Daemon/…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Marten&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several code paths in Marten&amp;#39;s LINQ provider and tenant-management internals interpolated a runtime, potentially attacker-influenced value into generated SQL as a single-quoted string literal without escaping or parameterization. A value containing a single quote (`&amp;#39;`) could break out of the literal and inject arbitrary SQL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The primary vector is a `Dictionary&amp;lt;,&amp;gt;` indexer **key** used in a `Where` filter — `Where(x =&amp;gt; x.Attributes[key] == v)` — a common &amp;#34;filter by attribute name&amp;#34; / EAV pattern. It is confirmed with an executed proof-of-concept and yields filter / multi-tenant authorization bypass (returning other tenants&amp;#39; rows) and blind data exfiltration. Where the application permits `;`-batched statements (Npgsql default), data modification is also possible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected sinks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryItemMember.cs` — dictionary indexer key (primary, confirmed PoC)
- `Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryContainsKeyFilter.cs` — `Dictionary.ContainsKey(key)` (Newtonsoft serializer only; System.Text.Json escapes the quote)
- `Linq/Parsing/SelectParser.cs` — a constant string projected through `Select(x =&amp;gt; new { L = runtimeString })`
- `Internal/Operations/DeleteAllForTenant.cs` — tenant id reaching per-tenant projection teardown via `IEventStore.DeleteProjectionProgressAsync` (an in-code comment wrongly claimed the value was validated)
- `Schema/DatabaseScopedTenantPartitions.cs` — tenant id inlined into `FOR VALUES IN (&amp;#39;...&amp;#39;)` partition DDL
- `Events/Daemon/…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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