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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 21:04:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-352838</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352838</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-352838</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352838</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73567</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73567</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;sm-crypto provides JavaScript implementations of the Chinese cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3, and SM4. Prior to 0.5.0, the default no-argument sm2.generateKeyPairHex() path in Node.js uses the module-wide SecureRandom instance in src/sm2/utils.js, supplied by jsbn@1.1.0, which seeds an ARC4 stream from Math.random() and new Date().getTime() because window.crypto.getRandomValues is unavailable even though globalThis.crypto exists. An attacker who can observe the process&amp;#39;s Math.random() outputs and estimate the key-generation time can reconstruct the seed, recover generated SM2 private keys, and predict signing ephemeral scalars used to forge signatures. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;sm-crypto provides JavaScript implementations of the Chinese cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3, and SM4. Prior to 0.5.0, the default no-argument sm2.generateKeyPairHex() path in Node.js uses the module-wide SecureRandom instance in src/sm2/utils.js, supplied by jsbn@1.1.0, which seeds an ARC4 stream from Math.random() and new Date().getTime() because window.crypto.getRandomValues is unavailable even though globalThis.crypto exists. An attacker who can observe the process&amp;#39;s Math.random() outputs and estimate the key-generation time can reconstruct the seed, recover generated SM2 private keys, and predict signing ephemeral scalars used to forge signatures. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vh45-f885-3848 — sm-crypto: Predictable SM2 key generation in Node.js: default RNG uses Math.random + wall clock</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vh45-f885-3848</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: sm-crypto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`sm-crypto` (npm package **0.4.0**, the latest release, published 2026-01-20)
generates SM2 private keys and signing ephemeral scalars from a single
module-wide RNG instance (`src/sm2/utils.js`: `const rng = new SecureRandom()`).
`SecureRandom` is jsbn&amp;#39;s PRNG, which seeds an **ARC4** stream from
`window.crypto.getRandomValues` when available. **In Node.js — sm-crypto&amp;#39;s
primary runtime — `window` is `undefined`, so the CSPRNG branch is skipped**
and the seed pool is instead filled from `Math.random()` (V8 `xorshift128+`,
recoverable from a few outputs) plus `new Date().getTime()` (wall clock,
attacker-estimable).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Node *does* expose Web Crypto as `globalThis.crypto`, but jsbn checks
`window.crypto`, not `globalThis.crypto`, so the secure path is never taken.
Consequently every SM2 private key produced by the default
`sm2.generateKeyPairHex()` and every signing ephemeral scalar is derived from
non-cryptographic sources and is **predictable** by an attacker who can observe
a few `Math.random()` outputs and estimate the generation time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the library&amp;#39;s **default** (no-argument) path; no caller-selected
parameter or configuration is required to trigger it. It is reproduced
end-to-end against the unmodified real npm packages (`sm-crypto@0.4.0` +
`jsbn@1.1.0`); the PoC below runs against the real installed package, not a
copy. The defect is still present on the latest published version (0.4.0) and
is not covered by any existing `JuneAndGreen/sm-crypto` issue (0 a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: sm-crypto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`sm-crypto` (npm package **0.4.0**, the latest release, published 2026-01-20)
generates SM2 private keys and signing ephemeral scalars from a single
module-wide RNG instance (`src/sm2/utils.js`: `const rng = new SecureRandom()`).
`SecureRandom` is jsbn&amp;#39;s PRNG, which seeds an **ARC4** stream from
`window.crypto.getRandomValues` when available. **In Node.js — sm-crypto&amp;#39;s
primary runtime — `window` is `undefined`, so the CSPRNG branch is skipped**
and the seed pool is instead filled from `Math.random()` (V8 `xorshift128+`,
recoverable from a few outputs) plus `new Date().getTime()` (wall clock,
attacker-estimable).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Node *does* expose Web Crypto as `globalThis.crypto`, but jsbn checks
`window.crypto`, not `globalThis.crypto`, so the secure path is never taken.
Consequently every SM2 private key produced by the default
`sm2.generateKeyPairHex()` and every signing ephemeral scalar is derived from
non-cryptographic sources and is **predictable** by an attacker who can observe
a few `Math.random()` outputs and estimate the generation time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the library&amp;#39;s **default** (no-argument) path; no caller-selected
parameter or configuration is required to trigger it. It is reproduced
end-to-end against the unmodified real npm packages (`sm-crypto@0.4.0` +
`jsbn@1.1.0`); the PoC below runs against the real installed package, not a
copy. The defect is still present on the latest published version (0.4.0) and
is not covered by any existing `JuneAndGreen/sm-crypto` issue (0 a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vh45-f885-3848</guid>
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