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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 10:46:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-352270</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352270</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-352270</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352270</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73430</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73430</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Prior to 0.62.4, an unauthenticated SSH client can cause a denial of service by sending SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT with a 32-byte all-zero Q_C value. Curve25519Kex::server_dh in russh/src/kex/curve25519.rs accepts the all-zero peer public value and computes an all-zero shared secret, after which compute_exchange_hash calls encode_mpint in russh/src/kex/mod.rs and indexes beyond the end of the input while skipping leading zero bytes. The resulting panic occurs before authentication and terminates the server key-exchange task. This issue is fixed in version 0.62.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Prior to 0.62.4, an unauthenticated SSH client can cause a denial of service by sending SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT with a 32-byte all-zero Q_C value. Curve25519Kex::server_dh in russh/src/kex/curve25519.rs accepts the all-zero peer public value and computes an all-zero shared secret, after which compute_exchange_hash calls encode_mpint in russh/src/kex/mod.rs and indexes beyond the end of the input while skipping leading zero bytes. The resulting panic occurs before authentication and terminates the server key-exchange task. This issue is fixed in version 0.62.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73430</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5xvq-cp9x-6p6r — Russh: Pre-auth remote panic via all-zero Curve25519 peer public value (encode_mpint OOB)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5xvq-cp9x-6p6r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pre-authentication denial-of-service panic in `russh` 0.62.2 (commit
`c4be19f1915c8682f4615c3fd50008512b474491`, current default branch `main` as
of 2026-07-22). An unauthenticated client sends a single `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT`
whose `Q_C` is 32 zero bytes. russh&amp;#39;s Curve25519 KEX does not reject the
all-zero peer public value, so `server_dh()` computes the all-zero shared
secret and `compute_exchange_hash()` then calls `encode_mpint(&amp;amp;shared.0, ...)`,
which indexes `s[i]` at `i == s.len()` and **panics** (`index out of bounds:
the len is 32 but the index is 32`) **before host-key signature verification**.
The server KEX task dies on the first KEX message, before authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable with the **default** server configuration
(`Config::default()` → `Preferred::DEFAULT`, whose kex list includes
`curve25519-sha256`) and requires **no caller-supplied parameter**. It is
reproduced end-to-end against the unmodified real russh 0.62.2 library (a real
server + raw TCP client over TCP); the PoC below links the real crate, not a
copied snippet. The defect is still present on `main` HEAD (`v0.62.3`,
2026-07-22) and is not covered by any of the 11 published russh GHSA advisories
(GHSA-cqvm-j2r2-hwpg / CVE-2023-28113 is modp DH group validation, not
Curve25519).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rust bounds-checked panics abort the task safely (no memory corruption / RCE);
the impact is remote **denial of service**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`russh/src/kex/curve25519.rs`, `server_dh()` (server path; attacker = client):…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pre-authentication denial-of-service panic in `russh` 0.62.2 (commit
`c4be19f1915c8682f4615c3fd50008512b474491`, current default branch `main` as
of 2026-07-22). An unauthenticated client sends a single `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT`
whose `Q_C` is 32 zero bytes. russh&amp;#39;s Curve25519 KEX does not reject the
all-zero peer public value, so `server_dh()` computes the all-zero shared
secret and `compute_exchange_hash()` then calls `encode_mpint(&amp;amp;shared.0, ...)`,
which indexes `s[i]` at `i == s.len()` and **panics** (`index out of bounds:
the len is 32 but the index is 32`) **before host-key signature verification**.
The server KEX task dies on the first KEX message, before authentication.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable with the **default** server configuration
(`Config::default()` → `Preferred::DEFAULT`, whose kex list includes
`curve25519-sha256`) and requires **no caller-supplied parameter**. It is
reproduced end-to-end against the unmodified real russh 0.62.2 library (a real
server + raw TCP client over TCP); the PoC below links the real crate, not a
copied snippet. The defect is still present on `main` HEAD (`v0.62.3`,
2026-07-22) and is not covered by any of the 11 published russh GHSA advisories
(GHSA-cqvm-j2r2-hwpg / CVE-2023-28113 is modp DH group validation, not
Curve25519).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rust bounds-checked panics abort the task safely (no memory corruption / RCE);
the impact is remote **denial of service**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`russh/src/kex/curve25519.rs`, `server_dh()` (server path; attacker = client):…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5xvq-cp9x-6p6r</guid>
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