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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 07:15:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-352271</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352271</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-352271</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-352271</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73423</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73423</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. From 7.0.0 until 7.0.6, the composable astro/hono pipeline installs security.checkOrigin only through the middleware() primitive, while actions() and pages() can dispatch to user code independently. Mounting actions() before middleware(), as in the examples/advanced-routing example and Cloudflare Hono documentation, allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the origin check, and using pages() without middleware() drops the check for on-demand endpoints and pages. The flaw enables blind write-only cross-site request forgery using the victim&amp;#39;s cookies against ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback when manifest.checkOrigin is enabled; the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler but cannot read the cross-origin response. The default non-composable astro() pipeline is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. From 7.0.0 until 7.0.6, the composable astro/hono pipeline installs security.checkOrigin only through the middleware() primitive, while actions() and pages() can dispatch to user code independently. Mounting actions() before middleware(), as in the examples/advanced-routing example and Cloudflare Hono documentation, allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the origin check, and using pages() without middleware() drops the check for on-demand endpoints and pages. The flaw enables blind write-only cross-site request forgery using the victim&amp;#39;s cookies against ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback when manifest.checkOrigin is enabled; the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler but cannot read the cross-origin response. The default non-composable astro() pipeline is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73423</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8mv7-9c27-98vc — Astro: composable `astro/hono` pipeline bypasses `security.checkOrigin` when `middleware()` is absent or misordered</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8mv7-9c27-98vc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: astro&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the composable `astro/hono` pipeline, the `security.checkOrigin` protection is only installed by the `middleware()` primitive. The `actions()` and `pages()` primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) `middleware()` will bypass the origin check for those requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`security.checkOrigin` (default: `true`) is intended to reject cross-site `POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` form submissions. In the classic pipeline (`astro()` all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no `src/middleware.ts`. In the composable `astro/hono` pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside `middleware()` — so:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Mounting `actions()` before `middleware()` allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. The `examples/advanced-routing` example and the Cloudflare `hono` docs shipped this order.
- Omitting `middleware()` entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently drops `checkOrigin` protection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched through `pages()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim&amp;#39;s cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Astro `&amp;gt;= 7.0.0` when using the composable `astro/hono` pipeline with either:
- `actions()…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: astro&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the composable `astro/hono` pipeline, the `security.checkOrigin` protection is only installed by the `middleware()` primitive. The `actions()` and `pages()` primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) `middleware()` will bypass the origin check for those requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`security.checkOrigin` (default: `true`) is intended to reject cross-site `POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` form submissions. In the classic pipeline (`astro()` all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no `src/middleware.ts`. In the composable `astro/hono` pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside `middleware()` — so:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Mounting `actions()` before `middleware()` allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. The `examples/advanced-routing` example and the Cloudflare `hono` docs shipped this order.
- Omitting `middleware()` entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently drops `checkOrigin` protection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched through `pages()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim&amp;#39;s cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Astro `&amp;gt;= 7.0.0` when using the composable `astro/hono` pipeline with either:
- `actions()…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8mv7-9c27-98vc</guid>
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