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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-409065</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409065</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-409065</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409065</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-71536</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71536</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Mareforma is a local verification layer for AI-assisted research. From 0.3.0 until 0.3.8, verify_bundle in mareforma/export_bundle.py validates the outer DSSE envelope and exporter-signed subject digests, but JSONLDExporter._claim_node in mareforma/exporters/jsonld.py supplies no signatureBundle for individual claims. Because the exporter signs both the predicate nodes and their digest list, the check proves only internal bundle consistency and allows claims with missing, invalid, or forged asserter signatures to be accepted as authentic. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Mareforma is a local verification layer for AI-assisted research. From 0.3.0 until 0.3.8, verify_bundle in mareforma/export_bundle.py validates the outer DSSE envelope and exporter-signed subject digests, but JSONLDExporter._claim_node in mareforma/exporters/jsonld.py supplies no signatureBundle for individual claims. Because the exporter signs both the predicate nodes and their digest list, the check proves only internal bundle consistency and allows claims with missing, invalid, or forged asserter signatures to be accepted as authentic. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71536</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hxh5-gp44-rc6p — Mareforma: verify_bundle never checks a per-claim signature</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hxh5-gp44-rc6p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mareforma&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## What&amp;#39;s wrong&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`verify_bundle` documents that it verifies &amp;#34;a bundle&amp;#39;s DSSE envelope AND each per-claim signature&amp;#34;, lists &amp;#34;per-claim signature failure&amp;#34; among its raised errors, and promises that partial verification never surfaces &amp;#34;an authenticated bundle that contains some invalid claims&amp;#34; as success. The code does not do this. The JSON-LD predicate built by `JSONLDExporter._claim_node` carries no signature material (there is no `signatureBundle` field on the node), so the verify loop has nothing cryptographic to check per claim. It only re-derives each claim&amp;#39;s canonical-statement digest from the node fields and compares it to the signed subject list:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
chain_input = _signing.canonical_statement({...node fields...}, node.get(&amp;#34;evidence&amp;#34;) or {})
expected = hashlib.sha256(chain_input).hexdigest()
if subjects[subject_name] != expected:
    raise BundleVerificationError(...)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That digest check is self-referential: the exporter signs both the subject digests and the predicate nodes with the same key. It confirms the bundle is internally consistent as built, not that each claim&amp;#39;s purported asserter ever validly signed it. The existing test `test_tampered_claim_text_in_predicate_fails` asserts a &amp;#34;digest mismatch&amp;#34;, confirming digest-only verification is the actual contract.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity and impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Medium.** All trust in a bundle collapses to the single exporter key. Whoever holds it (or a malicious exporter) can emit a bundle containing claims whose asserter signatur…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mareforma&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## What&amp;#39;s wrong&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`verify_bundle` documents that it verifies &amp;#34;a bundle&amp;#39;s DSSE envelope AND each per-claim signature&amp;#34;, lists &amp;#34;per-claim signature failure&amp;#34; among its raised errors, and promises that partial verification never surfaces &amp;#34;an authenticated bundle that contains some invalid claims&amp;#34; as success. The code does not do this. The JSON-LD predicate built by `JSONLDExporter._claim_node` carries no signature material (there is no `signatureBundle` field on the node), so the verify loop has nothing cryptographic to check per claim. It only re-derives each claim&amp;#39;s canonical-statement digest from the node fields and compares it to the signed subject list:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
chain_input = _signing.canonical_statement({...node fields...}, node.get(&amp;#34;evidence&amp;#34;) or {})
expected = hashlib.sha256(chain_input).hexdigest()
if subjects[subject_name] != expected:
    raise BundleVerificationError(...)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That digest check is self-referential: the exporter signs both the subject digests and the predicate nodes with the same key. It confirms the bundle is internally consistent as built, not that each claim&amp;#39;s purported asserter ever validly signed it. The existing test `test_tampered_claim_text_in_predicate_fails` asserts a &amp;#34;digest mismatch&amp;#34;, confirming digest-only verification is the actual contract.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity and impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Medium.** All trust in a bundle collapses to the single exporter key. Whoever holds it (or a malicious exporter) can emit a bundle containing claims whose asserter signatur…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hxh5-gp44-rc6p</guid>
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