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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-409062</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409062</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-409062</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409062</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-71534</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71534</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Mareforma is a local verification layer for AI-assisted research. From 0.3.0 until 0.3.8, restore logic in mareforma/db/restore.py derives transparency_logged from the unsigned rekor.uuid field inside signature_bundle without requiring a verified claim-bound rekor_inclusions entry, so an attacker who modifies claims.toml can falsely make a claim eligible for REPLICATED convergence. The same logic resets signed claims in non-Rekor graphs from transparency_logged 1 to 0 after restore, permanently preventing convergence because no Rekor refresh is configured. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Mareforma is a local verification layer for AI-assisted research. From 0.3.0 until 0.3.8, restore logic in mareforma/db/restore.py derives transparency_logged from the unsigned rekor.uuid field inside signature_bundle without requiring a verified claim-bound rekor_inclusions entry, so an attacker who modifies claims.toml can falsely make a claim eligible for REPLICATED convergence. The same logic resets signed claims in non-Rekor graphs from transparency_logged 1 to 0 after restore, permanently preventing convergence because no Rekor refresh is configured. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71534</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43 — Mareforma: transparency_logged trusts the unsigned rekor block</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xfq4-8hf9-5h43</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mareforma&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## What&amp;#39;s wrong&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During restore, `transparency_logged` is recomputed as `1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0`, where `bundle_has_rekor` comes only from a `rekor.uuid` field inside `signature_bundle`. That derivation is wrong in both directions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (`attach_rekor_entry` in `mareforma/signing/rekor.py` leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited `claims.toml` can add `&amp;#34;rekor&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;uuid&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;x&amp;#34;}` to any claim&amp;#39;s bundle and forge the &amp;#34;publicly witnessed by Rekor&amp;#34; state. The claim signature still verifies, and restore never cross-checks the block against `[rekor_inclusions]` or the log. Tampering with `claims.toml` is the exact threat model restore defends against; `_verify_claim_signatures_on_restore` checks only payload and signatures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, a signed claim in a graph that never used Rekor is written with `transparency_logged=1` (the column default when Rekor is disabled) but restores as 0 because its bundle has no rekor block. The convergence gate requires `transparency_logged = 1`, so post-restore peers can no longer converge to REPLICATED. With no `rekor_url` configured, `refresh_unsigned()` is a no-op and the flag stays 0 forever. Observed on the honest path: signed non-Rekor claim restores from `transparency_logged=1` to 0, and a subsequent peer stays at PRELIMINARY instead of converging.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity and impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**High.** An attacker…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mareforma&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## What&amp;#39;s wrong&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During restore, `transparency_logged` is recomputed as `1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0`, where `bundle_has_rekor` comes only from a `rekor.uuid` field inside `signature_bundle`. That derivation is wrong in both directions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (`attach_rekor_entry` in `mareforma/signing/rekor.py` leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited `claims.toml` can add `&amp;#34;rekor&amp;#34;: {&amp;#34;uuid&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;x&amp;#34;}` to any claim&amp;#39;s bundle and forge the &amp;#34;publicly witnessed by Rekor&amp;#34; state. The claim signature still verifies, and restore never cross-checks the block against `[rekor_inclusions]` or the log. Tampering with `claims.toml` is the exact threat model restore defends against; `_verify_claim_signatures_on_restore` checks only payload and signatures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, a signed claim in a graph that never used Rekor is written with `transparency_logged=1` (the column default when Rekor is disabled) but restores as 0 because its bundle has no rekor block. The convergence gate requires `transparency_logged = 1`, so post-restore peers can no longer converge to REPLICATED. With no `rekor_url` configured, `refresh_unsigned()` is a no-op and the flag stays 0 forever. Observed on the honest path: signed non-Rekor claim restores from `transparency_logged=1` to 0, and a subsequent peer stays at PRELIMINARY instead of converging.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity and impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**High.** An attacker…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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