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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-407380</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407380</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407380</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407380</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-69241</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69241</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Filament Curator is a media picker plugin for Filament panels. From 3.0.0 until 3.7.9, 4.1.2, and 5.1.2, the Curator media panel accepts image/svg+xml files by default and stores and serves their markup inline without sanitization. An authenticated user with media-upload permission can store an SVG containing scripts, event-handler attributes, or javascript: URIs. When another panel user selects the View action, the SVG opens as a top-level browser document and its active content executes in the Filament application&amp;#39;s origin. The script can perform authenticated same-origin actions as the viewing user and read same-origin data and script-accessible tokens. Panel thumbnails are not affected because they render through an image element that does not execute SVG script. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.9, 4.1.2, and 5.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Filament Curator is a media picker plugin for Filament panels. From 3.0.0 until 3.7.9, 4.1.2, and 5.1.2, the Curator media panel accepts image/svg+xml files by default and stores and serves their markup inline without sanitization. An authenticated user with media-upload permission can store an SVG containing scripts, event-handler attributes, or javascript: URIs. When another panel user selects the View action, the SVG opens as a top-level browser document and its active content executes in the Filament application&amp;#39;s origin. The script can perform authenticated same-origin actions as the viewing user and read same-origin data and script-accessible tokens. Panel thumbnails are not affected because they render through an image element that does not execute SVG script. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.9, 4.1.2, and 5.1.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69241</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8vm9-f75m-5h2m — Filament Curator: Stored XSS via unsanitized SVG upload served inline</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8vm9-f75m-5h2m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: awcodes/filament-curator&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SVG files uploaded through the Curator media panel are stored and served inline without any
  sanitization. An authenticated user with permission to upload media can upload an SVG
  containing embedded JavaScript. When another panel user opens that file via the **View**
  action (which opens the media as a top-level browser document), the embedded script executes
  in the origin of the Filament application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`image/svg+xml` is included in the default accepted MIME types, so a default installation is
  affected unless SVG uploads have been explicitly disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the SVG is served as a **top-level document** (not embedded in an `&amp;lt;img&amp;gt;` tag), any
  `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;`, event-handler attribute (e.g. `onload`), or `javascript:` URI inside it runs with
  full script privileges in the application&amp;#39;s origin. In a Filament admin context this can be
  leveraged to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- perform actions as the viewing user (typically a privileged administrator) via
  authenticated same-origin requests,
  - read same-origin data the victim&amp;#39;s session can access,
  - exfiltrate cookies/tokens not protected from script access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The primary escalation path is a lower-privileged content author planting a payload that is
  later triggered when a higher-privileged user clicks **View** on the file. Panel thumbnails
  are **not** affected — they render through an `&amp;lt;img&amp;gt;` tag, which does not execute SVG script.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. As a user who can upload media, upload an SV…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: awcodes/filament-curator&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SVG files uploaded through the Curator media panel are stored and served inline without any
  sanitization. An authenticated user with permission to upload media can upload an SVG
  containing embedded JavaScript. When another panel user opens that file via the **View**
  action (which opens the media as a top-level browser document), the embedded script executes
  in the origin of the Filament application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`image/svg+xml` is included in the default accepted MIME types, so a default installation is
  affected unless SVG uploads have been explicitly disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the SVG is served as a **top-level document** (not embedded in an `&amp;lt;img&amp;gt;` tag), any
  `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;`, event-handler attribute (e.g. `onload`), or `javascript:` URI inside it runs with
  full script privileges in the application&amp;#39;s origin. In a Filament admin context this can be
  leveraged to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- perform actions as the viewing user (typically a privileged administrator) via
  authenticated same-origin requests,
  - read same-origin data the victim&amp;#39;s session can access,
  - exfiltrate cookies/tokens not protected from script access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The primary escalation path is a lower-privileged content author planting a payload that is
  later triggered when a higher-privileged user clicks **View** on the file. Panel thumbnails
  are **not** affected — they render through an `&amp;lt;img&amp;gt;` tag, which does not execute SVG script.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. As a user who can upload media, upload an SV…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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