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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-409036</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409036</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-409036</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409036</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-69139</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69139</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;djangocms-moderation provides an approval workflow mechanism for organizations that require content approval before publication. Prior to 2.4.0, CollectionCommentAdmin and RequestCommentAdmin in the Django admin use changelist_view and changeform_view to scope comment access through caller-controlled object identifiers and model-level view_collectioncomment or view_requestcomment permissions without invoking ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments() or an equivalent collection participant check. An authenticated staff user with either view permission can enumerate collection or moderation-request identifiers and read full comment messages for workflows they do not participate in. The exposure affects confidentiality of internal editorial discussions; comment creation, modification, and deletion remain protected, and integrity and availability are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;djangocms-moderation provides an approval workflow mechanism for organizations that require content approval before publication. Prior to 2.4.0, CollectionCommentAdmin and RequestCommentAdmin in the Django admin use changelist_view and changeform_view to scope comment access through caller-controlled object identifiers and model-level view_collectioncomment or view_requestcomment permissions without invoking ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments() or an equivalent collection participant check. An authenticated staff user with either view permission can enumerate collection or moderation-request identifiers and read full comment messages for workflows they do not participate in. The exposure affects confidentiality of internal editorial discussions; comment creation, modification, and deletion remain protected, and integrity and availability are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69139</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pj7p-238h-76pv — djangocms-moderation: Moderation comments disclosed to non-participant staff via the admin changelist</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pj7p-238h-76pv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djangocms-moderation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Django admin views for moderation comments (`CollectionCommentAdmin` and `RequestCommentAdmin`) render the full comment body but scope access only by an attacker-controlled `id` in the URL and Django&amp;#39;s model-level `view_*comment` permission. They perform no per-object participant check. As a result, any authenticated staff user who holds the comment *view* permission can read the comments of **any** collection or moderation request — including ones they are not a participant of — simply by supplying the target object&amp;#39;s id.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Comments are documented and intended to be private to the participants of a collection (its author and the moderators assigned to its workflow). This advisory concerns a read/write authorization asymmetry: the write paths already enforced `request.user == obj.author`, but the read paths did not enforce any participant check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments()` — the gate intended to protect comment reads (author **or** assigned moderator) — existed in the codebase but was never called by the comment admins. Neither `CollectionCommentAdmin` nor `RequestCommentAdmin` overrode `get_queryset`, and their `changelist_view` / `changeform_view` methods resolved the target object directly from the user-supplied id without an authorization check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The changelists are hard-scoped to a single collection / moderation request (they `raise Http404` when no id is present), so the exposure is not &amp;#34;all comments at once,&amp;#34; but any specif…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djangocms-moderation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Django admin views for moderation comments (`CollectionCommentAdmin` and `RequestCommentAdmin`) render the full comment body but scope access only by an attacker-controlled `id` in the URL and Django&amp;#39;s model-level `view_*comment` permission. They perform no per-object participant check. As a result, any authenticated staff user who holds the comment *view* permission can read the comments of **any** collection or moderation request — including ones they are not a participant of — simply by supplying the target object&amp;#39;s id.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Comments are documented and intended to be private to the participants of a collection (its author and the moderators assigned to its workflow). This advisory concerns a read/write authorization asymmetry: the write paths already enforced `request.user == obj.author`, but the read paths did not enforce any participant check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ModerationRequest.user_can_view_comments()` — the gate intended to protect comment reads (author **or** assigned moderator) — existed in the codebase but was never called by the comment admins. Neither `CollectionCommentAdmin` nor `RequestCommentAdmin` overrode `get_queryset`, and their `changelist_view` / `changeform_view` methods resolved the target object directly from the user-supplied id without an authorization check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The changelists are hard-scoped to a single collection / moderation request (they `raise Http404` when no id is present), so the exposure is not &amp;#34;all comments at once,&amp;#34; but any specif…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pj7p-238h-76pv</guid>
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