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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:14:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-11003</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-11003</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-11003</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2026-11003</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-343957</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343957</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-343957</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343957</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-69089</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69089</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Grav CMS 2.0.10 contains a path traversal vulnerability in ImageMedium::watermark(), which passes its unsanitized $image argument to RocketTheme\Toolbox\ResourceLocator\UniformResourceLocator::findResource(). Because the file:// scheme branch only lexically collapses &amp;#39;..&amp;#39; segments without a realpath/containment check, an editor authoring Markdown image syntax with traversal sequences can cause arbitrary image files outside Grav&amp;#39;s media sandbox to be composited into a carrier image, which is then cached and served from a public, unauthenticated URL — disclosing those files to anonymous visitors.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Grav CMS 2.0.10 contains a path traversal vulnerability in ImageMedium::watermark(), which passes its unsanitized $image argument to RocketTheme\Toolbox\ResourceLocator\UniformResourceLocator::findResource(). Because the file:// scheme branch only lexically collapses &amp;#39;..&amp;#39; segments without a realpath/containment check, an editor authoring Markdown image syntax with traversal sequences can cause arbitrary image files outside Grav&amp;#39;s media sandbox to be composited into a carrier image, which is then cached and served from a public, unauthenticated URL — disclosing those files to anonymous visitors.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69089</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w3f4-8pj2-599w — Grav: Path Traversal in ImageMedium::watermark() — arbitrary file disclosure via publicly-cached images</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w3f4-8pj2-599w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported by: Nihad Huseynli (@nihaddhuseynli (https://github.com/nihaddhuseynli)) — nihadd.huseynli@gmail.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;▎ Note: I attempted to report this via security@getgrav.org first, per SECURITY.md, but the email bounced with 550 5.1.1 Address does not exist. Filing directly here instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Path Traversal in ImageMedium::watermark() leading to arbitrary file disclosure via publicly-served images&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The watermark media action, documented and allow-listed for use in editor-authored Markdown image syntax, passes its $image argument unsanitized into UniformResourceLocator::findResource(). That resolver only lexically collapses .. segments (no realpath()/containment check) and, for the default file:// scheme, resolves straight to file_exists() with no re-validation against the registered stream root. A relative-path traversal string therefore resolves to an arbitrary absolute path on disk. If that path is a valid image, its pixel content is composited into the carrier image and the result is cached and served from a public, unauthenticated URL — i.e. any file outside Grav&amp;#39;s media sandbox that happens to be a decodable image becomes visible to anonymous visitors, not just to the attacker.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected version&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Grav CMS, develop/2.0 line, commit db8c1fcd63aaaf6d6b244bc6b4cfa5f7b96bbc7f (tip of 2.0.11 post-release).
- Root cause lives in the pinned dependency rockettheme/toolbox v2.x-dev @ c569a53304cd7d95ff21bffa6fc590adcf0be83d (per composer.lock), specifically RocketTheme\Toolbo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported by: Nihad Huseynli (@nihaddhuseynli (https://github.com/nihaddhuseynli)) — nihadd.huseynli@gmail.com&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;▎ Note: I attempted to report this via security@getgrav.org first, per SECURITY.md, but the email bounced with 550 5.1.1 Address does not exist. Filing directly here instead.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Path Traversal in ImageMedium::watermark() leading to arbitrary file disclosure via publicly-served images&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The watermark media action, documented and allow-listed for use in editor-authored Markdown image syntax, passes its $image argument unsanitized into UniformResourceLocator::findResource(). That resolver only lexically collapses .. segments (no realpath()/containment check) and, for the default file:// scheme, resolves straight to file_exists() with no re-validation against the registered stream root. A relative-path traversal string therefore resolves to an arbitrary absolute path on disk. If that path is a valid image, its pixel content is composited into the carrier image and the result is cached and served from a public, unauthenticated URL — i.e. any file outside Grav&amp;#39;s media sandbox that happens to be a decodable image becomes visible to anonymous visitors, not just to the attacker.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected version&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Grav CMS, develop/2.0 line, commit db8c1fcd63aaaf6d6b244bc6b4cfa5f7b96bbc7f (tip of 2.0.11 post-release).
- Root cause lives in the pinned dependency rockettheme/toolbox v2.x-dev @ c569a53304cd7d95ff21bffa6fc590adcf0be83d (per composer.lock), specifically RocketTheme\Toolbo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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