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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 04:33:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-343763</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343763</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-343763</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-343763</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-68930</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68930</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Prior to 0.62.5, russh dispatches channel-scoped Handler callbacks for recipient channel IDs that were never opened or confirmed in russh/src/server/encrypted.rs, server_read_authenticated, and the exec_request callback. Version 0.62.5 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Prior to 0.62.5, russh dispatches channel-scoped Handler callbacks for recipient channel IDs that were never opened or confirmed in russh/src/server/encrypted.rs, server_read_authenticated, and the exec_request callback. Version 0.62.5 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68930</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m65r-rprj-r5rg — Russh: Channel-scoped server callbacks can be reached without an open channel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m65r-rprj-r5rg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is a server-side channel state issue in `russh`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After a client is authenticated, `russh` can dispatch channel-scoped handler callbacks for recipient channel IDs that were never opened or confirmed. In the strongest reproduced case, the client does not send `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN` at all. It authenticates normally, then sends `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST` packets with request type `exec` for a range of recipient channel IDs. `russh` still calls the server application&amp;#39;s `exec_request` handler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is not an authentication bypass. A valid login is required. The issue is that the SSH channel lifecycle is not enforced before channel-scoped callbacks are delivered to the application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated client can bypass the server application&amp;#39;s channel-open policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A server may deny session channels by returning `false` from `Handler::channel_open_session`. A server may also assume that callbacks such as `exec_request`, `shell_request`, `subsystem_request`, `data`, `channel_eof`, or `channel_close` are only delivered for channels that were opened and confirmed by the SSH transport layer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That assumption does not hold in the vulnerable path. A malicious authenticated peer can send channel-scoped messages for arbitrary recipient channel IDs and cause handler callbacks to run even though no channel exists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exact impact depends on the downstream application. For many SSH server use cases, `exec_request`, `shell_request`, or `subsystem_request` start commands, job…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is a server-side channel state issue in `russh`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After a client is authenticated, `russh` can dispatch channel-scoped handler callbacks for recipient channel IDs that were never opened or confirmed. In the strongest reproduced case, the client does not send `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN` at all. It authenticates normally, then sends `SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST` packets with request type `exec` for a range of recipient channel IDs. `russh` still calls the server application&amp;#39;s `exec_request` handler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is not an authentication bypass. A valid login is required. The issue is that the SSH channel lifecycle is not enforced before channel-scoped callbacks are delivered to the application.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated client can bypass the server application&amp;#39;s channel-open policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A server may deny session channels by returning `false` from `Handler::channel_open_session`. A server may also assume that callbacks such as `exec_request`, `shell_request`, `subsystem_request`, `data`, `channel_eof`, or `channel_close` are only delivered for channels that were opened and confirmed by the SSH transport layer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That assumption does not hold in the vulnerable path. A malicious authenticated peer can send channel-scoped messages for arbitrary recipient channel IDs and cause handler callbacks to run even though no channel exists.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exact impact depends on the downstream application. For many SSH server use cases, `exec_request`, `shell_request`, or `subsystem_request` start commands, job…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m65r-rprj-r5rg</guid>
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