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      <title>EUVD-2026-361331</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361331</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-361331</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-361331</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-68929</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68929</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FastGPT is an open-source LLM platform for building AI applications on a knowledge base. In versions prior to 4.15.2, the WeChat (iLink) share-channel endpoints authorize requests using only the public shareId, with no authenticated identity or team-ownership check. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim team&amp;#39;s shareId can take that team&amp;#39;s WeChat bot offline or hijack the channel to their own bot: the logout endpoint is gated only by an existence check yet wipes the outLink&amp;#39;s stored WeChat token, and the QR-code status endpoint performs no authorization at all and writes attacker-supplied bot credentials into the outLink identified by shareId. By generating a QR for a victim shareId, scanning it with their own WeChat, and calling the status endpoint, an attacker binds the victim team&amp;#39;s app to the attacker&amp;#39;s bot, exposing the app&amp;#39;s private responses, displacing the legitimate binding, and consuming the victim&amp;#39;s resources. The shareId is exposed in every shared chat URL, iframe, and embed, so it is not a secret. This issue is fixed in version 4.15.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FastGPT is an open-source LLM platform for building AI applications on a knowledge base. In versions prior to 4.15.2, the WeChat (iLink) share-channel endpoints authorize requests using only the public shareId, with no authenticated identity or team-ownership check. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim team&amp;#39;s shareId can take that team&amp;#39;s WeChat bot offline or hijack the channel to their own bot: the logout endpoint is gated only by an existence check yet wipes the outLink&amp;#39;s stored WeChat token, and the QR-code status endpoint performs no authorization at all and writes attacker-supplied bot credentials into the outLink identified by shareId. By generating a QR for a victim shareId, scanning it with their own WeChat, and calling the status endpoint, an attacker binds the victim team&amp;#39;s app to the attacker&amp;#39;s bot, exposing the app&amp;#39;s private responses, displacing the legitimate binding, and consuming the victim&amp;#39;s resources. The shareId is exposed in every shared chat URL, iframe, and embed, so it is not a secret. This issue is fixed in version 4.15.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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