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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-408972</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408972</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-408972</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-408972</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-68903</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68903</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;LLMKube is a Kubernetes operator for self-hosted large language model inference across heterogeneous hardware. Prior to 0.9.0, the ModelReconciler accepts arbitrary absolute paths and file:// URIs in Model.spec.source without restricting them to approved roots. A namespace user who can create or update Model and InferenceService resources can cause copyLocalModel to open an attacker-selected file in the controller pod or cause a HostPathVolumeSource to mount an attacker-selected node file when modelCache.enabled is enabled, which is the default. The selected file is copied into model storage and can expose controller service-account credentials or other node secrets outside the attacker&amp;#39;s namespace. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;LLMKube is a Kubernetes operator for self-hosted large language model inference across heterogeneous hardware. Prior to 0.9.0, the ModelReconciler accepts arbitrary absolute paths and file:// URIs in Model.spec.source without restricting them to approved roots. A namespace user who can create or update Model and InferenceService resources can cause copyLocalModel to open an attacker-selected file in the controller pod or cause a HostPathVolumeSource to mount an attacker-selected node file when modelCache.enabled is enabled, which is the default. The selected file is copied into model storage and can expose controller service-account credentials or other node secrets outside the attacker&amp;#39;s namespace. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-68903</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r — LLMKube: Arbitrary Host File Read via Model.spec.source hostPath Injection</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jw3m-8q7m-f35r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/defilantech/llmkube&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LLMKube&amp;#39;s `ModelReconciler` accepts arbitrary absolute paths and `file://` URIs in the `Model.spec.source` field and propagates them to two distinct sinks without path allowlisting: (1) `os.Open()` inside the controller pod itself (`copyLocalModel`), and (2) a Kubernetes `HostPathVolumeSource` that mounts the attacker-supplied path into the inference pod&amp;#39;s init container. Any namespace user with permission to create or update `Model` and `InferenceService` custom resources can read arbitrary files accessible to the controller pod (e.g., the controller&amp;#39;s own Kubernetes service-account token) or arbitrary files on the node where the inference pod is scheduled (e.g., `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf`). Model caching, the feature that activates the `hostPath` sink, is **enabled by default** in both the CLI and the official Helm chart. CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.7 (High)**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point — `Model.spec.source` field**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `Source` field in `api/v1alpha1/model_types.go:47-48` carries a `kubebuilder` validation pattern that explicitly permits absolute paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// +kubebuilder:validation:Pattern=`^(https?|file|pvc|hf)://.*|^/[^\s]+$|^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w\-\.\/]+$`
Source string `json:&amp;#34;source&amp;#34;`
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The branch `^/[^\s]+$` matches any non-whitespace absolute path on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Sink 1 — Controller-pod arbitrary file read (`copyLocalModel`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`internal/controller/source.go:93-103` classifies a source as local and extracts the path with no sanitization:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
//…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/defilantech/llmkube&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LLMKube&amp;#39;s `ModelReconciler` accepts arbitrary absolute paths and `file://` URIs in the `Model.spec.source` field and propagates them to two distinct sinks without path allowlisting: (1) `os.Open()` inside the controller pod itself (`copyLocalModel`), and (2) a Kubernetes `HostPathVolumeSource` that mounts the attacker-supplied path into the inference pod&amp;#39;s init container. Any namespace user with permission to create or update `Model` and `InferenceService` custom resources can read arbitrary files accessible to the controller pod (e.g., the controller&amp;#39;s own Kubernetes service-account token) or arbitrary files on the node where the inference pod is scheduled (e.g., `/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf`). Model caching, the feature that activates the `hostPath` sink, is **enabled by default** in both the CLI and the official Helm chart. CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.7 (High)**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Entry point — `Model.spec.source` field**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `Source` field in `api/v1alpha1/model_types.go:47-48` carries a `kubebuilder` validation pattern that explicitly permits absolute paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// +kubebuilder:validation:Pattern=`^(https?|file|pvc|hf)://.*|^/[^\s]+$|^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w\-\.\/]+$`
Source string `json:&amp;#34;source&amp;#34;`
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The branch `^/[^\s]+$` matches any non-whitespace absolute path on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Sink 1 — Controller-pod arbitrary file read (`copyLocalModel`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`internal/controller/source.go:93-103` classifies a source as local and extracts the path with no sanitization:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
//…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jw3m-8q7m-f35r</guid>
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