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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 04:18:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-405332</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405332</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-405332</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405332</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-67543</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67543</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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