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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-349125</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349125</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-349125</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-349125</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-67531</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67531</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FrontMCP is a TypeScript-first framework for the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Prior to 1.5.7, the sandboxed codecall:execute tool exposes live host Zod schema instances to the script via getTool(), and because Zod v4 defines _zod as a non-configurable, non-writable own property, the ECMAScript Proxy invariants force the security membrane to hand back the raw host object, letting a script reach _zod.constr.constructor (the host Function constructor) and execute arbitrary code in the server process. A single tools/call is sufficient to escape the sandbox and achieve remote code execution as the server user, exposing everything the process holds such as OAuth client secrets, JWT_SECRET, session keys, database credentials, and cloud instance metadata. Because the framework&amp;#39;s DEFAULT_AUTH_OPTIONS is public mode, an unconfigured server serves this to unauthenticated callers, and on authenticated servers an indirect prompt injection in tool output or fetched content can trigger it without a human attackerThis issue is fixed in version 1.5.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FrontMCP is a TypeScript-first framework for the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Prior to 1.5.7, the sandboxed codecall:execute tool exposes live host Zod schema instances to the script via getTool(), and because Zod v4 defines _zod as a non-configurable, non-writable own property, the ECMAScript Proxy invariants force the security membrane to hand back the raw host object, letting a script reach _zod.constr.constructor (the host Function constructor) and execute arbitrary code in the server process. A single tools/call is sufficient to escape the sandbox and achieve remote code execution as the server user, exposing everything the process holds such as OAuth client secrets, JWT_SECRET, session keys, database credentials, and cloud instance metadata. Because the framework&amp;#39;s DEFAULT_AUTH_OPTIONS is public mode, an unconfigured server serves this to unauthenticated callers, and on authenticated servers an indirect prompt injection in tool output or fetched content can trigger it without a human attackerThis issue is fixed in version 1.5.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67531</guid>
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