https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 15:53:25 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-344042 EUVD-2026-344042 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-344042 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-66883 <p>Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.Authorize module) renders the user agent session binding inert, removing a defense in depth control against replay of a stolen session.</p> <p>This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/oidcc/plug/authorize.ex and lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex, and program routines Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 and Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2.</p> <p>Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 reads the initiating client&#39;s user agent with get_req_header(conn, &#34;User-Agent&#34;). Plug lowercases incoming header names, but get_req_header/2 matches the supplied key exactly and performs no normalization of its own, so the mixed-case lookup always returns an empty list and nil is written into the session. On the callback side, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback treats a stored nil user agent as nothing to compare and returns :ok without inspecting the request. The two behaviours combine so that the check passes unconditionally on every request, including for deployments that explicitly opted in with check_useragent: true, and an authorization callback can be completed from a different user agent than the one that initiated the flow without detection. The check fails open silently, with no error and no log entry, so a deployment cannot tell the binding is absent.</p> <p>The impact is limited to defense in depth. The inert check does not by itself allow an attacker to complete an authorization flow; i…</p> <p>Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.Authorize module) renders the user agent session binding inert, removing a defense in depth control against replay of a stolen session.</p> <p>This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/oidcc/plug/authorize.ex and lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex, and program routines Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 and Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2.</p> <p>Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 reads the initiating client&#39;s user agent with get_req_header(conn, &#34;User-Agent&#34;). Plug lowercases incoming header names, but get_req_header/2 matches the supplied key exactly and performs no normalization of its own, so the mixed-case lookup always returns an empty list and nil is written into the session. On the callback side, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback treats a stored nil user agent as nothing to compare and returns :ok without inspecting the request. The two behaviours combine so that the check passes unconditionally on every request, including for deployments that explicitly opted in with check_useragent: true, and an authorization callback can be completed from a different user agent than the one that initiated the flow without detection. The check fails open silently, with no error and no log entry, so a deployment cannot tell the binding is absent.</p> <p>The impact is limited to defense in depth. The inert check does not by itself allow an attacker to complete an authorization flow; i…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-66883