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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-341010</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341010</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-341010</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341010</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64785</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64785</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let CR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend through NIOHTTP2&amp;#39;s HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling or response splitting. This vulnerability is addressed in swift-nio-http2 version 1.45.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let CR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend through NIOHTTP2&amp;#39;s HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling or response splitting. This vulnerability is addressed in swift-nio-http2 version 1.45.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64785</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c — swift-nio-http2: Missing CR/LF/NUL validation in header values</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q3g2-m552-3r9c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; SwiftURL: swift-nio-http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let
CR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend
through NIOHTTP2&amp;#39;s HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling
or response splitting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two related gaps in inbound header validation, against any application
using HTTP2ToHTTP1Codec (or HTTP2FramePayloadToHTTP1Codec) to front an
HTTP/1.1 backend:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Regular header field values were only checked against a forbidden-name
list (connection, transfer-encoding, proxy-connection, keep-alive,
upgrade); the value itself was never inspected. An attacker-controlled
regular header field value containing CR or LF passed validation and, once
serialized as `name: value CRLF` by the codec, terminated the field early
and injected extra header lines into the outbound HTTP/1.1 message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pseudo-header values (`:path` in particular) were only checked against
CR, LF and NUL. A `:path` value containing SP serializes into the
request-target of `METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF`, so a
value like `/a HTTP/1.1` produces `GET /a HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1` — a
parser-differential request line depending on whether a downstream reader
takes the first or last SP-delimited token as the version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither of these is reachable on a stock pipeline: NIOHTTP1&amp;#39;s outbound
validator (`enableOutboundHeaderValidation`, on by default) already rejects
these characters on write. The exposure is pipelines that skip outbound
validation, or an…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; SwiftURL: swift-nio-http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let
CR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend
through NIOHTTP2&amp;#39;s HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling
or response splitting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two related gaps in inbound header validation, against any application
using HTTP2ToHTTP1Codec (or HTTP2FramePayloadToHTTP1Codec) to front an
HTTP/1.1 backend:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Regular header field values were only checked against a forbidden-name
list (connection, transfer-encoding, proxy-connection, keep-alive,
upgrade); the value itself was never inspected. An attacker-controlled
regular header field value containing CR or LF passed validation and, once
serialized as `name: value CRLF` by the codec, terminated the field early
and injected extra header lines into the outbound HTTP/1.1 message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pseudo-header values (`:path` in particular) were only checked against
CR, LF and NUL. A `:path` value containing SP serializes into the
request-target of `METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF`, so a
value like `/a HTTP/1.1` produces `GET /a HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1` — a
parser-differential request line depending on whether a downstream reader
takes the first or last SP-delimited token as the version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither of these is reachable on a stock pipeline: NIOHTTP1&amp;#39;s outbound
validator (`enableOutboundHeaderValidation`, on by default) already rejects
these characters on write. The exposure is pipelines that skip outbound
validation, or an…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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