https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:16:33 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341475 EUVD-2026-341475 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341475 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63740 <p>SurrealDB versions before 3.1.4 fail to properly enforce SELECT permissions on array elements (field.*) for record users, leaking denied array elements instead of hiding them. Attackers with record scope access can read array elements that element-level permissions should deny by exploiting incorrect index handling during permission filtering.</p> <p>SurrealDB versions before 3.1.4 fail to properly enforce SELECT permissions on array elements (field.*) for record users, leaking denied array elements instead of hiding them. Attackers with record scope access can read array elements that element-level permissions should deny by exploiting incorrect index handling during permission filtering.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63740 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rw6-p7m8-63jp <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: surrealdb</p> <p>A `SELECT` permission defined on an array element (`DEFINE FIELD field.* … PERMISSIONS FOR select …`) is not enforced correctly for `RECORD` users. Instead of hiding the denied elements, the query leaks a subset of them: a deny-all returns the odd-indexed elements, and a per-element predicate keeps and drops the wrong ones.</p> <p>The filter removed each denied element by index while walking the array forwards. Because removing an element shifts every later index down, each cut invalidated the indices still pending in the loop, leaving denied elements behind. Field-level permissions are enforced correctly; only the element (`field.*`) level is affected, and only for record users — root and record-owner sessions are not.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>What an attacker **can** do:</p> <p>- As a record (scope) user, read array elements that an element-level (`field.*`) SELECT permission should hide, on any table they can already SELECT. - Recover denied elements through both a deny-all and a `WHERE` predicate — the wrong elements are selected either way.</p> <p>What it **can&#39;t** do:</p> <p>- Bypass field-level SELECT permissions, which are evaluated correctly. - Affect root or record-owner sessions, or cross namespace/database isolation. - Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability (confidentiality only).</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>The three permission-filtering paths (`doc/reduce.rs`, `doc/output.rs`, `exec/operators/scan/pipeline.rs`) now remove denied elements in reverse index order, so removing one element no longer…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: surrealdb</p> <p>A `SELECT` permission defined on an array element (`DEFINE FIELD field.* … PERMISSIONS FOR select …`) is not enforced correctly for `RECORD` users. Instead of hiding the denied elements, the query leaks a subset of them: a deny-all returns the odd-indexed elements, and a per-element predicate keeps and drops the wrong ones.</p> <p>The filter removed each denied element by index while walking the array forwards. Because removing an element shifts every later index down, each cut invalidated the indices still pending in the loop, leaving denied elements behind. Field-level permissions are enforced correctly; only the element (`field.*`) level is affected, and only for record users — root and record-owner sessions are not.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>What an attacker **can** do:</p> <p>- As a record (scope) user, read array elements that an element-level (`field.*`) SELECT permission should hide, on any table they can already SELECT. - Recover denied elements through both a deny-all and a `WHERE` predicate — the wrong elements are selected either way.</p> <p>What it **can&#39;t** do:</p> <p>- Bypass field-level SELECT permissions, which are evaluated correctly. - Affect root or record-owner sessions, or cross namespace/database isolation. - Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability (confidentiality only).</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>The three permission-filtering paths (`doc/reduce.rs`, `doc/output.rs`, `exec/operators/scan/pipeline.rs`) now remove denied elements in reverse index order, so removing one element no longer…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rw6-p7m8-63jp