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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:19:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-341470</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341470</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-341470</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341470</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63735</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63735</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 fail to validate namespace and database scope in custom API routes, allowing authenticated users to invoke endpoints in different namespaces/databases. Attackers with valid credentials for any namespace/database can access custom API endpoints in other tenants by specifying the target scope in the URL path, reading sensitive data or triggering unintended operations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 fail to validate namespace and database scope in custom API routes, allowing authenticated users to invoke endpoints in different namespaces/databases. Attackers with valid credentials for any namespace/database can access custom API endpoints in other tenants by specifying the target scope in the URL path, reading sensitive data or triggering unintended operations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63735</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw — SurrealDB: Custom API route lets authenticated callers override namespace/database scope via URL path</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-848m-r628-vrxw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: surrealdb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user scoped to one namespace/database could invoke a custom API (`DEFINE API`) belonging to a different namespace/database, reaching another tenant&amp;#39;s endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route `/api/{namespace}/{database}/{endpoint}` took the namespace and database from the URL and applied them to the caller&amp;#39;s session before the endpoint was looked up or run, without checking that the caller&amp;#39;s authenticated scope covered them. Because a custom API handler runs with permissions disabled (definer&amp;#39;s rights), the endpoint&amp;#39;s own `PERMISSIONS` clause was the only gate — open to everyone for a `PERMISSIONS FULL` endpoint. The `api::invoke()` function was affected the same way, resolving against the session&amp;#39;s selected namespace/database (settable via the `surreal-ns` / `surreal-db` headers or `USE`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What an attacker **can** do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- With valid credentials for any one namespace/database (a `VIEWER` is enough), invoke a custom API in another namespace/database by naming the victim scope in the URL.
- Read data that endpoint returns — including from `PERMISSIONS NONE` tables, since the handler runs with permissions disabled — or trigger any writes and side effects it performs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What it **can&amp;#39;t** do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Reach a scope without valid credentials for some namespace/database on the instance; this is not an unauthenticated bypass.
- Affect single-tenant deployments, or any deployment where callers already hold instance-wide (root) scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The namespace/database is now vali…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: surrealdb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated user scoped to one namespace/database could invoke a custom API (`DEFINE API`) belonging to a different namespace/database, reaching another tenant&amp;#39;s endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The route `/api/{namespace}/{database}/{endpoint}` took the namespace and database from the URL and applied them to the caller&amp;#39;s session before the endpoint was looked up or run, without checking that the caller&amp;#39;s authenticated scope covered them. Because a custom API handler runs with permissions disabled (definer&amp;#39;s rights), the endpoint&amp;#39;s own `PERMISSIONS` clause was the only gate — open to everyone for a `PERMISSIONS FULL` endpoint. The `api::invoke()` function was affected the same way, resolving against the session&amp;#39;s selected namespace/database (settable via the `surreal-ns` / `surreal-db` headers or `USE`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What an attacker **can** do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- With valid credentials for any one namespace/database (a `VIEWER` is enough), invoke a custom API in another namespace/database by naming the victim scope in the URL.
- Read data that endpoint returns — including from `PERMISSIONS NONE` tables, since the handler runs with permissions disabled — or trigger any writes and side effects it performs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What it **can&amp;#39;t** do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Reach a scope without valid credentials for some namespace/database on the instance; this is not an unauthenticated bypass.
- Affect single-tenant deployments, or any deployment where callers already hold instance-wide (root) scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The namespace/database is now vali…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-848m-r628-vrxw</guid>
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