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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-399700</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399700</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-399700</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399700</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63501</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63501</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ag-psd is a JavaScript library for reading and writing Photoshop Document files. Prior to 31.0.3, readPsd() accepts a totalMemoryLimit for parsing untrusted PSD files, but decodeLayerImageData expects a differently named memoryLimit property and therefore passes an undefined limit to createImageDataBitDepth. An attacker who can supply a PSD to an application with layer decoding enabled can use attacker-controlled layer dimensions to trigger an allocation larger than the configured limit, causing process memory exhaustion and denial of service. The advisory also identifies inflateSync(compressed) decompressing ZIP-encoded channel data without an output-size cap, which can cause a similar denial of service through unbounded decompression. This vulnerability is fixed in 31.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ag-psd is a JavaScript library for reading and writing Photoshop Document files. Prior to 31.0.3, readPsd() accepts a totalMemoryLimit for parsing untrusted PSD files, but decodeLayerImageData expects a differently named memoryLimit property and therefore passes an undefined limit to createImageDataBitDepth. An attacker who can supply a PSD to an application with layer decoding enabled can use attacker-controlled layer dimensions to trigger an allocation larger than the configured limit, causing process memory exhaustion and denial of service. The advisory also identifies inflateSync(compressed) decompressing ZIP-encoded channel data without an output-size cap, which can cause a similar denial of service through unbounded decompression. This vulnerability is fixed in 31.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63501</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6w3r-6hpr-hp6p — ag-psd: Uncontrolled Memory Allocation in PSD Layer Decoding (totalMemoryLimit bypass)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6w3r-6hpr-hp6p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: ag-psd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `readPsd()` function in `ag-psd` accepts a `totalMemoryLimit` option to cap memory usage when parsing untrusted PSD files, but this limit is never forwarded to the layer image buffer allocation path. A property name mismatch (`totalMemoryLimit` vs. `memoryLimit`) causes the size guard inside `createImageDataBitDepth` to be skipped unconditionally. An attacker who can supply a crafted PSD to any application using `ag-psd` for server-side parsing can force an unbounded heap allocation — a 5000×5000 layer in a 86-byte file allocates 200 MB — leading to denial of service through process memory exhaustion regardless of what limit the caller specified.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`readPsd()` (exported from `src/index.ts:22`) wraps caller-supplied bytes in a `PsdReader` object that inherits `ReadOptions`, which defines `totalMemoryLimit?: number` (`src/psd.ts:1819`). A default of 2 GB is written into the reader at `src/psdReader.ts:237`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the parser reaches a layer, it calls `decodeLayerImageData(layer, reader)` at `src/psdReader.ts:568-569`, passing the `reader` object directly as the second argument. The `decodeLayerImageData` function signature is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// src/psdReader.ts:639-642
function decodeLayerImageData(layer: Layer, options: {
    useImageData?: boolean,
    throwForMissingFeatures?: boolean,
    memoryLimit?: number   // ← expects &amp;#34;memoryLimit&amp;#34;, not &amp;#34;totalMemoryLimit&amp;#34;
}) {
    const imageData = getDataFromLayer(layer, ..., options.memoryLimit);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `rea…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: ag-psd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `readPsd()` function in `ag-psd` accepts a `totalMemoryLimit` option to cap memory usage when parsing untrusted PSD files, but this limit is never forwarded to the layer image buffer allocation path. A property name mismatch (`totalMemoryLimit` vs. `memoryLimit`) causes the size guard inside `createImageDataBitDepth` to be skipped unconditionally. An attacker who can supply a crafted PSD to any application using `ag-psd` for server-side parsing can force an unbounded heap allocation — a 5000×5000 layer in a 86-byte file allocates 200 MB — leading to denial of service through process memory exhaustion regardless of what limit the caller specified.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`readPsd()` (exported from `src/index.ts:22`) wraps caller-supplied bytes in a `PsdReader` object that inherits `ReadOptions`, which defines `totalMemoryLimit?: number` (`src/psd.ts:1819`). A default of 2 GB is written into the reader at `src/psdReader.ts:237`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the parser reaches a layer, it calls `decodeLayerImageData(layer, reader)` at `src/psdReader.ts:568-569`, passing the `reader` object directly as the second argument. The `decodeLayerImageData` function signature is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// src/psdReader.ts:639-642
function decodeLayerImageData(layer: Layer, options: {
    useImageData?: boolean,
    throwForMissingFeatures?: boolean,
    memoryLimit?: number   // ← expects &amp;#34;memoryLimit&amp;#34;, not &amp;#34;totalMemoryLimit&amp;#34;
}) {
    const imageData = getDataFromLayer(layer, ..., options.memoryLimit);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because `rea…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6w3r-6hpr-hp6p</guid>
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