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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-399708</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399708</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-399708</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-399708</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63478</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63478</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;isomorphic-git is a pure JavaScript implementation of Git for Node.js and browsers. Prior to 1.38.6, isomorphic-git&amp;#39;s tree parser in src/models/GitTree.js accepts a standalone .. tree-entry name because it rejects only path separators. During clone or checkout from a malicious or man-in-the-middle-controlled non-GitHub remote, nested .. entries can escape the working-tree root and write files at attacker-selected parent paths on any host-backed fs provider. The arbitrary file write can overwrite startup or configuration files and lead to code execution. GitHub-hosted trees are not a direct source because GitHub rejects .. entries during repository integrity checks. This issue is fixed in version 1.38.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;isomorphic-git is a pure JavaScript implementation of Git for Node.js and browsers. Prior to 1.38.6, isomorphic-git&amp;#39;s tree parser in src/models/GitTree.js accepts a standalone .. tree-entry name because it rejects only path separators. During clone or checkout from a malicious or man-in-the-middle-controlled non-GitHub remote, nested .. entries can escape the working-tree root and write files at attacker-selected parent paths on any host-backed fs provider. The arbitrary file write can overwrite startup or configuration files and lead to code execution. GitHub-hosted trees are not a direct source because GitHub rejects .. entries during repository integrity checks. This issue is fixed in version 1.38.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63478</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cw2g-2vwq-88w6 — isomorphic-git: Path traversal via a ".." tree-entry name writes files outside the working directory on clone/checkout</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cw2g-2vwq-88w6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: isomorphic-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
isomorphic-git&amp;#39;s tree parser (`src/models/GitTree.js`) validates each entry name only against the path separators `/` and `\`. It does not reject the standalone reserved name `..`, so a malicious repository can, on a single `clone`/`checkout`, **write files outside the working
directory** (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed `fs` provider.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The guard is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// src/models/GitTree.js
if (path.includes(&amp;#39;\\&amp;#39;) || path.includes(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)) {
  throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The standalone string `..` passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting `..` trees yields `../escaped.txt`, `../../escaped.txt`, … with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout `mkdir(workdir/..)` hits `EEXIST` (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, `/etc`, `/tmp`, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Canonical git behavior (divergence)
git rejects this via `verify_path()`: `git read-tree` fails with `error: invalid path &amp;#39;../escaped.txt&amp;#39;` and `git fsck` flags `warning … hasDotdot: contains &amp;#39;..&amp;#39;`. (git&amp;#39;s `verify_path` also rejects `.` and `.git`, the latter flagged by fsck as `hasDotgit` — see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can&amp;#39;t be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
`htt…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: isomorphic-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
isomorphic-git&amp;#39;s tree parser (`src/models/GitTree.js`) validates each entry name only against the path separators `/` and `\`. It does not reject the standalone reserved name `..`, so a malicious repository can, on a single `clone`/`checkout`, **write files outside the working
directory** (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed `fs` provider.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The guard is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// src/models/GitTree.js
if (path.includes(&amp;#39;\\&amp;#39;) || path.includes(&amp;#39;/&amp;#39;)) {
  throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The standalone string `..` passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting `..` trees yields `../escaped.txt`, `../../escaped.txt`, … with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout `mkdir(workdir/..)` hits `EEXIST` (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, `/etc`, `/tmp`, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Canonical git behavior (divergence)
git rejects this via `verify_path()`: `git read-tree` fails with `error: invalid path &amp;#39;../escaped.txt&amp;#39;` and `git fsck` flags `warning … hasDotdot: contains &amp;#39;..&amp;#39;`. (git&amp;#39;s `verify_path` also rejects `.` and `.git`, the latter flagged by fsck as `hasDotgit` — see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can&amp;#39;t be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
`htt…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cw2g-2vwq-88w6</guid>
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