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EUVD-2026-371971

fkie_cve-2026-63405

AnyCable is a realtime server for reliable two-way communication that supports any backend. Prior to 1.6.15, the Pusher-compatible REST API in pusher/http.go includes the caller-supplied body_md5 value in the HMAC input but does not calculate the digest of the received request body or compare it with the signed value. An attacker who obtains a legitimate signed POST request can retain its query parameters and auth_signature while replacing the body, causing Handler and handleEvents to accept and broadcast attacker-selected event content. The absence of an auth_timestamp freshness check also allows the captured signature to be replayed indefinitely. This can forge server-side events, modify application state, or deliver attacker-controlled messages to WebSocket clients within the signed request's application context. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.15.

GHSA-5p54-whvp-x327 — AnyCable: Pusher REST API Does Not Verify Request Body MD5 Enabling Signed-Request Replay with Arbitrary Body

Affected: Go: github.com/anycable/anycable

### Summary The Pusher-compatible REST API includes `body_md5` in the HMAC signature string but never computes or verifies the MD5 of the received HTTP body, allowing anyone who observes a signed request to replay it with an entirely different body.

### Details In `pusher/http.go`, the `Handler` function extracts `body_md5` from the URL query string (line 169) and includes it verbatim in `stringToSign` (line 175). It then verifies `HMAC(stringToSign, secret) == auth_signature`. After verification succeeds, `handleEvents` reads and parses `r.Body` (lines 201-212) without ever computing `md5(body)` and comparing it against the `body_md5` that was signed. The Pusher protocol specification explicitly requires the server to verify this digest to prevent body-substitution attacks. There is also no `auth_timestamp` staleness check, so replays are valid indefinitely.

### PoC 1. Capture a legitimate signed POST to `/apps/<app_id>/events?auth_key=K&auth_timestamp=T&auth_version=1.0&body_md5=LEGIT_MD5&auth_signature=SIG` carrying body `{"name":"safe-event","channel":"ch","data":"..."}` (e.g., from TLS-terminating load-balancer logs). 2. Send a new request with the same query string parameters but a different body: `{"name":"injected-event","channel":"admin","data":"malicious-payload"}` 3. The server accepts the request (HMAC over `stringToSign` matches the original) and broadcasts the injected event to all subscribers of `admin`.

### Impact An attacker who can read any single sig…