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EUVD-2026-364165

fkie_cve-2026-63376

toml-node is a TOML parser for Node.js and the browser. Prior to 4.1.2, toml.parse() in lib/compiler.js can be tricked by a table path such as a.b.y.__proto__.__proto__, allowing traversal from a scalar value into Number.prototype and Object.prototype. The currentPath tracking value uses both arrays and strings, so valueAssignments records a comma-joined path such as a,b.y while deepRef checks the dot-joined path a.b.y, allowing the duplicate-key guard to miss and attacker-controlled keys to be written to Object.prototype. A table-array prefix-clearing path in addTableArray can also erase guard state before the same __proto__ traversal. Injected properties become visible throughout the Node.js process and can cause denial of service, logic or authorization bypass, or code execution when an application contains a suitable gadget. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.2.

GHSA-v5mp-jgw5-2x6j — toml-node: Prototype Pollution Leads to `Object.prototype` Corruption via `proto` Key-Path Desynchronization

Affected: npm: toml

### Summary

`toml.parse()` writes attacker-controlled keys onto `Object.prototype`. The compiler protects the tables it builds by creating them with `Object.create(null)`, which neutralizes a direct `[__proto__]` table. An attacker bypasses that protection by routing a table path *through a scalar value* and into the real prototype chain: a path such as `a.b.y.__proto__.__proto__`, where `a.b.y` holds a number, resolves to `Object.prototype` and every subsequent key/value writes onto it.

The bypass succeeds because the compiler's duplicate-key guards track paths with keys that do not match the keys used during traversal. The tracking strings and the traversal strings **desynchronize**, so the guard that should reject descending through an existing scalar never fires.

### Steps to reproduce

1. Install the latest version and run the comma-desynchronization payload.

```bash npm install toml@4.1.1 ```

```js const toml = require("toml"); delete Object.prototype.polluted;

toml.parse(` [a.b] y = 1 [a.b.y.__proto__.__proto__] polluted = "yes" `);

console.log(({}).polluted); // -> "yes" ```

2. Observe that a freshly created object inherits the injected key, confirming `Object.prototype` was modified:

``` yes ```

3. Confirm the prefix-clear variant reaches the same result:

```js toml.parse(` aa = 1 [[a]] [aa.__proto__.__proto__] polluted = "yes" `); console.log(({}).polluted); // -> "yes" ```…

Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-364165

fkie_cve-2026-63376

GHSA-v5mp-jgw5-2x6j — toml-node: Prototype Pollution Leads to `Object.prototype` Corruption via `__proto__` Key-Path Desynchronization

GHSA-v5mp-jgw5-2x6j — toml-node: Prototype Pollution Leads to `Object.prototype` Corruption via `proto` Key-Path Desynchronization