<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 04:47:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-340912</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-340912</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-340912</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-340912</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63317</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63317</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Versions Affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- before 2.5.10
- before 3.0.0-M5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected paths are:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Versions Affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- before 2.5.10
- before 3.0.0-M5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected paths are:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63317</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-ccq5-x868-5p6x</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ccq5-x868-5p6x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Versions Affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- before 2.5.10
- before 3.0.0-M5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected paths are:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Versions Affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- before 2.5.10
- before 3.0.0-M5&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Description:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected paths are:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ccq5-x868-5p6x</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11369-1 — opennlp-1.9.5-2.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11369-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;opennlp-1.9.5-2.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;opennlp-1.9.5-2.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11369-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-63317</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63317</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: apache-opennlp, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: apache-opennlp, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: apache-opennlp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: apache-opennlp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP Versions Affected: - before 2.5.10 - before 3.0.0-M5 Description: Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type. The affected paths are: (1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. (2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). (3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: apache-opennlp, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: apache-opennlp, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: apache-opennlp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: apache-opennlp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Arbitrary Class Instantiation via XML Feature Generator Descriptor and Format Name in Apache OpenNLP Versions Affected: - before 2.5.10 - before 3.0.0-M5 Description: Three code paths in Apache OpenNLP load a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invoke its no-arg constructor without any prior validation of the class name or its type. The affected paths are: (1) GeneratorFactory, which reads the class attribute of generator elements in an XML feature generator descriptor; such descriptors are embedded as artifacts in model archives (e.g. TokenNameFinder and POSTagger models) and are parsed during model loading, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive controls the class name directly. (2) StreamFactoryRegistry.getFactory(Class, String), which falls back to interpreting an unregistered format name as the fully-qualified class name of an ObjectStreamFactory; this is exploitable in applications that pass untrusted format names (e.g. exposing the -format parameter of the command-line tooling to external input). (3) StringInterners, which instantiates the interner implementation named by the opennlp.interner.class system property; this value is normally deployer-controlled, so it is hardened as defense in depth rather than being independently attacker-reachable. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer or no-arg constructor (JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, filesystem access) to be present on the…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-63317</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
