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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:31:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-330512</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330512</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330512</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330512</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-6329</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-6329</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-6329</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r98j-g9p3-fcgm</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r98j-g9p3-fcgm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r98j-g9p3-fcgm</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-6329 — PKCS#12 MAC verification uses attacker-controlled comparison length</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-6329</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-6329</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-6329</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-6329</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-6329</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-6329</guid>
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