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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 22:44:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338075</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338075</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338075</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338075</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-62843</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62843</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. From 2.63.6 to 2.63.16, File Browser&amp;#39;s archive builder uses strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, &amp;#34;\&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;), which turns a POSIX filename such as ..\..\evil.sh into the archive entry ../../evil.sh, allowing a user with upload permission to plant a backslash-named file that escapes the extraction directory when another user downloads and extracts the generated zip or tar archive. This issue is fixed in version 2.63.17.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. From 2.63.6 to 2.63.16, File Browser&amp;#39;s archive builder uses strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, &amp;#34;\&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;), which turns a POSIX filename such as ..\..\evil.sh into the archive entry ../../evil.sh, allowing a user with upload permission to plant a backslash-named file that escapes the extraction directory when another user downloads and extracts the generated zip or tar archive. This issue is fixed in version 2.63.17.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62843</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-83xp-526h-j3ww — File Browser: Archive builder turns backslash filenames into path traversal (zip-slip)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-83xp-526h-j3ww</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for `GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8` / `CVE-2026-54093` (shipped in v2.63.6) added a `strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, &amp;#34;\\&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` step to the archive builder; this was the advisory&amp;#39;s recommended &amp;#34;Primary Fix.&amp;#34; On a Linux host a backslash is a legal, non-separator filename character, so replacing it with the real POSIX separator `/` **manufactures** a `/`-delimited traversal sequence out of a benign single file name. The fix neutralized the Windows-only vector but reintroduced the same class of bug on POSIX systems, and the advisory&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;Secondary Mitigation&amp;#34; (reject backslash filenames at creation time) was never implemented, so the malicious file can still be planted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A file named `..\..\evil.sh`, one ordinary regular file on a Linux server, is emitted into generated zip/tar archives as the entry `../../evil.sh`. Any user with upload (Create) permission can plant such a file; when anyone later downloads the containing folder as an archive and extracts it, the entry escapes the extraction directory on the victim&amp;#39;s machine. The original advisory&amp;#39;s own payload `..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.txt` now becomes `../../../Windows/System32/evil.txt`, which, unlike before the fix, also traverses on Linux and macOS extractors. The fix turned a Windows-only zip-slip into a cross-platform one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. The archive builder rewrites backslashes into path separators (`http/raw.go:133`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
nameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)
nameInArchive = string…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for `GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8` / `CVE-2026-54093` (shipped in v2.63.6) added a `strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, &amp;#34;\\&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;)` step to the archive builder; this was the advisory&amp;#39;s recommended &amp;#34;Primary Fix.&amp;#34; On a Linux host a backslash is a legal, non-separator filename character, so replacing it with the real POSIX separator `/` **manufactures** a `/`-delimited traversal sequence out of a benign single file name. The fix neutralized the Windows-only vector but reintroduced the same class of bug on POSIX systems, and the advisory&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;Secondary Mitigation&amp;#34; (reject backslash filenames at creation time) was never implemented, so the malicious file can still be planted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A file named `..\..\evil.sh`, one ordinary regular file on a Linux server, is emitted into generated zip/tar archives as the entry `../../evil.sh`. Any user with upload (Create) permission can plant such a file; when anyone later downloads the containing folder as an archive and extracts it, the entry escapes the extraction directory on the victim&amp;#39;s machine. The original advisory&amp;#39;s own payload `..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.txt` now becomes `../../../Windows/System32/evil.txt`, which, unlike before the fix, also traverses on Linux and macOS extractors. The fix turned a Windows-only zip-slip into a cross-platform one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. The archive builder rewrites backslashes into path separators (`http/raw.go:133`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
nameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)
nameInArchive = string…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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