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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-338893</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338893</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-338893</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338893</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-62685</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62685</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.17, File Browser builds new user scopes from usernames passed through cleanUsername() when Signup=true and CreateUserDir=true, but the many-to-one normalization can collapse usernames such as team/one, team one, and team-one to the same home directory without checking whether the resulting scope is already taken, allowing a second registrant to gain full read and write access to another user&amp;#39;s files. This issue is fixed in version 2.63.17.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.17, File Browser builds new user scopes from usernames passed through cleanUsername() when Signup=true and CreateUserDir=true, but the many-to-one normalization can collapse usernames such as team/one, team one, and team-one to the same home directory without checking whether the resulting scope is already taken, allowing a second registrant to gain full read and write access to another user&amp;#39;s files. This issue is fixed in version 2.63.17.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62685</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7rc3-g7h6-22m7 — File Browser: Colliding username normalization gives two users the same home directory</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7rc3-g7h6-22m7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FileBrowser confines each user to a *scope*: a home directory that acts as the boundary for everything they can read or write. When self-registration and automatic home-directory creation are both enabled (`Signup=true` and `CreateUserDir=true`), a new user&amp;#39;s scope is built from their username after it passes through `cleanUsername()`. That function rewrites the name: it strips `..` and replaces every character outside `0-9A-Za-z@_\-.` with `-`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The problem is that this rewrite is **many-to-one**: different usernames can produce the same result, and FileBrowser never checks whether the resulting scope is already taken. So `team/one`, `team one`, and `team-one` all collapse to the same directory name, and whoever registers second is handed the **same home directory** as the first user instead of an isolated one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This breaks per-user isolation. An attacker can pick a username that normalizes onto a victim&amp;#39;s directory (for example registering `alice/` or `al..ice` to land in `alice`&amp;#39;s home) and gain full read **and** write access to that victim&amp;#39;s files. Because username uniqueness is enforced on the raw name, both accounts coexist normally and neither user is warned that they share storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. The home directory is built straight from the cleaned username (`settings/dir.go:30`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// MakeUserDir, when CreateUserDir is true:
username = cleanUsername(username)
// ...
userScope = path.Join(s.UserHomeBasePath, username)   // line 30
userScope = pa…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FileBrowser confines each user to a *scope*: a home directory that acts as the boundary for everything they can read or write. When self-registration and automatic home-directory creation are both enabled (`Signup=true` and `CreateUserDir=true`), a new user&amp;#39;s scope is built from their username after it passes through `cleanUsername()`. That function rewrites the name: it strips `..` and replaces every character outside `0-9A-Za-z@_\-.` with `-`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The problem is that this rewrite is **many-to-one**: different usernames can produce the same result, and FileBrowser never checks whether the resulting scope is already taken. So `team/one`, `team one`, and `team-one` all collapse to the same directory name, and whoever registers second is handed the **same home directory** as the first user instead of an isolated one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This breaks per-user isolation. An attacker can pick a username that normalizes onto a victim&amp;#39;s directory (for example registering `alice/` or `al..ice` to land in `alice`&amp;#39;s home) and gain full read **and** write access to that victim&amp;#39;s files. Because username uniqueness is enforced on the raw name, both accounts coexist normally and neither user is warned that they share storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. The home directory is built straight from the cleaned username (`settings/dir.go:30`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
// MakeUserDir, when CreateUserDir is true:
username = cleanUsername(username)
// ...
userScope = path.Join(s.UserHomeBasePath, username)   // line 30
userScope = pa…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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