https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 20:40:15 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-62385 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Published `nltk==3.9.4` still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and trusted-root bypass - **Affected component:** `FramenetCorpusReader.frame_by_name`, `FramenetCorpusReader.doc`, `FramenetCorpusReader.lu`, `NKJPCorpusReader.header` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` reproduced. Current source `v3.10.0-rc2` acted as a negative control and blocked the same payloads. - **Patched versions:** Patched in version 3.10.0, which includes the path-safety rejections seen in the release candidate. - **Root cause:** Stable reader paths still construct raw XML filenames from unsafe selectors, poisoned index state, or unsafe file identifiers.</p> <p>I confirmed four public stable entrypoints return parsed outside-root content: a parent-segment traversal frame name, a poisoned fulltext index filename, a poisoned LU id, and an unsafe NKJP header file identifier. Current source rejects the same payloads with explicit path-safety errors, which shows the bug is real but version-scoped to the published stable package.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application exposes FrameNet or NKJP reader APIs while trusting NLTK to keep XML parsing inside a corpus root.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a minimal FrameNet or NKJP corpus root and place attacker-chosen XML files outside that root. 2. Feed unsafe s…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: acronym</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Published `nltk==3.9.4` still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and trusted-root bypass - **Affected component:** `FramenetCorpusReader.frame_by_name`, `FramenetCorpusReader.doc`, `FramenetCorpusReader.lu`, `NKJPCorpusReader.header` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` reproduced. Current source `v3.10.0-rc2` acted as a negative control and blocked the same payloads. - **Patched versions:** Patched in version 3.10.0, which includes the path-safety rejections seen in the release candidate. - **Root cause:** Stable reader paths still construct raw XML filenames from unsafe selectors, poisoned index state, or unsafe file identifiers.</p> <p>I confirmed four public stable entrypoints return parsed outside-root content: a parent-segment traversal frame name, a poisoned fulltext index filename, a poisoned LU id, and an unsafe NKJP header file identifier. Current source rejects the same payloads with explicit path-safety errors, which shows the bug is real but version-scoped to the published stable package.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application exposes FrameNet or NKJP reader APIs while trusting NLTK to keep XML parsing inside a corpus root.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a minimal FrameNet or NKJP corpus root and place attacker-chosen XML files outside that root. 2. Feed unsafe s…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-acronym-cve-2026-62385 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358311 EUVD-2026-358311 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-358311 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62385 <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62385 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-568f-pv23-39p4 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Published `nltk==3.9.4` still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and trusted-root bypass - **Affected component:** `FramenetCorpusReader.frame_by_name`, `FramenetCorpusReader.doc`, `FramenetCorpusReader.lu`, `NKJPCorpusReader.header` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` reproduced. Current source `v3.10.0-rc2` acted as a negative control and blocked the same payloads. - **Patched versions:** Patched in version 3.10.0, which includes the path-safety rejections seen in the release candidate. - **Root cause:** Stable reader paths still construct raw XML filenames from unsafe selectors, poisoned index state, or unsafe file identifiers.</p> <p>I confirmed four public stable entrypoints return parsed outside-root content: a parent-segment traversal frame name, a poisoned fulltext index filename, a poisoned LU id, and an unsafe NKJP header file identifier. Current source rejects the same payloads with explicit path-safety errors, which shows the bug is real but version-scoped to the published stable package.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application exposes FrameNet or NKJP reader APIs while trusting NLTK to keep XML parsing inside a corpus root.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a minimal FrameNet or NKJP corpus root and place attacker-chosen XML files outside that root. 2. Feed unsafe s…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Published `nltk==3.9.4` still contains several XML-reader entrypoints that build parser paths from caller-controlled selectors or trusted-looking index state without preserving the corpus-root boundary.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>- **Vulnerability type:** Path traversal and trusted-root bypass - **Affected component:** `FramenetCorpusReader.frame_by_name`, `FramenetCorpusReader.doc`, `FramenetCorpusReader.lu`, `NKJPCorpusReader.header` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` reproduced. Current source `v3.10.0-rc2` acted as a negative control and blocked the same payloads. - **Patched versions:** Patched in version 3.10.0, which includes the path-safety rejections seen in the release candidate. - **Root cause:** Stable reader paths still construct raw XML filenames from unsafe selectors, poisoned index state, or unsafe file identifiers.</p> <p>I confirmed four public stable entrypoints return parsed outside-root content: a parent-segment traversal frame name, a poisoned fulltext index filename, a poisoned LU id, and an unsafe NKJP header file identifier. Current source rejects the same payloads with explicit path-safety errors, which shows the bug is real but version-scoped to the published stable package.</p> <p>### PoC</p> <p>**Preconditions** - The application exposes FrameNet or NKJP reader APIs while trusting NLTK to keep XML parsing inside a corpus root.</p> <p>**Steps** 1. Create a minimal FrameNet or NKJP corpus root and place attacker-chosen XML files outside that root. 2. Feed unsafe s…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-568f-pv23-39p4 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3728 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3728 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-62385 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: nltk, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: nltk</p> <p>NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-62385