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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 07:09:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407047</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407047</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407047</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407047</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-62336</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62336</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.27, the privileged createFile helper followed attacker-controlled symbolic links during file creation. A local unprivileged user whose account is managed by the SSH Keys bundle could replace ~/.ssh with a link to /root/.ssh, causing the agent to write an authorized key for root. On systems using RAUC download mode with ineffective kernel symlink protection, the predictable /tmp/.bundle.raucb.part path could be linked to a system file and then overwritten or truncated during an update. A file-distribution destination beneath an attacker-controlled directory could similarly redirect the partial-download path so the agent changed ownership of a sensitive file. These vectors could result in root privilege escalation, arbitrary file modification, or denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 2026.27.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.27, the privileged createFile helper followed attacker-controlled symbolic links during file creation. A local unprivileged user whose account is managed by the SSH Keys bundle could replace ~/.ssh with a link to /root/.ssh, causing the agent to write an authorized key for root. On systems using RAUC download mode with ineffective kernel symlink protection, the predictable /tmp/.bundle.raucb.part path could be linked to a system file and then overwritten or truncated during an update. A file-distribution destination beneath an attacker-controlled directory could similarly redirect the partial-download path so the agent changed ownership of a sensitive file. These vectors could result in root privilege escalation, arbitrary file modification, or denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 2026.27.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62336</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xhv5-8fpq-g7hf — qbee-agent: Local Privilege Escalation and Arbitrary File Tampering via Symlink Following in createFile helper</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xhv5-8fpq-g7hf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.qbee.io/agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerability stemming from improper symlink handling (CWE-59: Link Following) and improper ownership management (CWE-282) inside the qbee-agent file manager logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any managed device running qbee-agent up to the affected versions. The impact manifests in three distinct vectors:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Primary Vector (Full Privilege Escalation to Root - Default Configuration)**: If an unprivileged user&amp;#39;s account is managed by the SSH Keys bundle, they can replace or remove their own `~/.ssh` directory and create a symlink pointing to `/root/.ssh`. On the next configuration apply, qbee-agent follows the symlink and writes the user&amp;#39;s server-provisioned public key directly into `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. Since the symlink resides inside the user&amp;#39;s own home directory, kernel protections like `fs.protected_symlinks` do not block this execution. The attacker can then instantly log in as root via SSH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Secondary Vector (Arbitrary File Overwrite / DoS via RAUC Staging)**: On devices utilizing RAUC download mode, the agent uses a predictable, world-writable staging path (`/tmp/.bundle.raucb.part`). If `fs.protected_symlinks` is disabled `(0)`, an unprivileged user can symlink this path to a vital system file (e.g., `/etc/shadow` or `/etc/pam.d/*`), causing the agent to truncate or overwrite it with server-supplied update data during a RAUC update deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. **Tertiary Vector (Arbitrary File Re-ownership via File Distribution)**: If a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.qbee.io/agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerability stemming from improper symlink handling (CWE-59: Link Following) and improper ownership management (CWE-282) inside the qbee-agent file manager logic.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any managed device running qbee-agent up to the affected versions. The impact manifests in three distinct vectors:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Primary Vector (Full Privilege Escalation to Root - Default Configuration)**: If an unprivileged user&amp;#39;s account is managed by the SSH Keys bundle, they can replace or remove their own `~/.ssh` directory and create a symlink pointing to `/root/.ssh`. On the next configuration apply, qbee-agent follows the symlink and writes the user&amp;#39;s server-provisioned public key directly into `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys`. Since the symlink resides inside the user&amp;#39;s own home directory, kernel protections like `fs.protected_symlinks` do not block this execution. The attacker can then instantly log in as root via SSH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Secondary Vector (Arbitrary File Overwrite / DoS via RAUC Staging)**: On devices utilizing RAUC download mode, the agent uses a predictable, world-writable staging path (`/tmp/.bundle.raucb.part`). If `fs.protected_symlinks` is disabled `(0)`, an unprivileged user can symlink this path to a vital system file (e.g., `/etc/shadow` or `/etc/pam.d/*`), causing the agent to truncate or overwrite it with server-supplied update data during a RAUC update deployment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. **Tertiary Vector (Arbitrary File Re-ownership via File Distribution)**: If a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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