<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 01:36:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-404823</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404823</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-404823</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404823</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61810</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61810</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM specifications. In version 1.4.0, both the FINISH request (Table 80) and the FINISH_RSP response (Table 81) gained two new fields, OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, placed before the trailing signed/authenticated field. The transcript definitions used to compute and verify the FINISH signature, the FINISH HMAC (RequesterVerifyData), and the FINISH_RSP HMAC (ResponderVerifyData) were not updated and still terminate with a step of the form. Per DSP0274, the &amp;#34;SPDM Header Fields&amp;#34; are only the four header bytes (SPDMVersion, RequestResponseCode, Param1, Param2). A literal reading therefore excludes OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, even though those fields are transmitted before the trailing signature/HMAC field. Because the signature/HMAC must cover every field transmitted before it to &amp;#34;protect the entire handshake against manipulation by an active attacker,&amp;#34; an active attacker could otherwise modify the opaque data in flight without invalidating the signature or HMAC. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libspdm is a sample implementation that follows the DMTF SPDM specifications. In version 1.4.0, both the FINISH request (Table 80) and the FINISH_RSP response (Table 81) gained two new fields, OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, placed before the trailing signed/authenticated field. The transcript definitions used to compute and verify the FINISH signature, the FINISH HMAC (RequesterVerifyData), and the FINISH_RSP HMAC (ResponderVerifyData) were not updated and still terminate with a step of the form. Per DSP0274, the &amp;#34;SPDM Header Fields&amp;#34; are only the four header bytes (SPDMVersion, RequestResponseCode, Param1, Param2). A literal reading therefore excludes OpaqueDataLength and OpaqueData, even though those fields are transmitted before the trailing signature/HMAC field. Because the signature/HMAC must cover every field transmitted before it to &amp;#34;protect the entire handshake against manipulation by an active attacker,&amp;#34; an active attacker could otherwise modify the opaque data in flight without invalidating the signature or HMAC. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61810</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
