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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 14:01:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-369341</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369341</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-369341</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-369341</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61560</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61560</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;`@zereight/mcp-gitlab` is a Model Context Protocol server for GitLab. Prior to version 2.1.27, the SSE transport mode (`SSE=true`) exposes all MCP tools without any authentication. The `upload_markdown` tool reads arbitrary files from the server&amp;#39;s local filesystem via an unsanitized `file_path` parameter and uploads them to a GitLab project. Combined, any unauthenticated network-reachable attacker can read `/proc/self/environ` to steal the server&amp;#39;s `GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN` and achieve full GitLab account takeover. This is the default configuration for Docker deployments. Version 2.1.27 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;`@zereight/mcp-gitlab` is a Model Context Protocol server for GitLab. Prior to version 2.1.27, the SSE transport mode (`SSE=true`) exposes all MCP tools without any authentication. The `upload_markdown` tool reads arbitrary files from the server&amp;#39;s local filesystem via an unsanitized `file_path` parameter and uploads them to a GitLab project. Combined, any unauthenticated network-reachable attacker can read `/proc/self/environ` to steal the server&amp;#39;s `GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN` and achieve full GitLab account takeover. This is the default configuration for Docker deployments. Version 2.1.27 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61560</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cv3r-c5h8-f4g5 — @zereight/mcp-gitlab: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via `upload_markdown` enables PAT exfiltration and full accou…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cv3r-c5h8-f4g5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @zereight/mcp-gitlab&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSE transport mode (`SSE=true`) exposes all MCP tools without any authentication. The `upload_markdown` tool reads arbitrary files from the server&amp;#39;s local filesystem via an unsanitized `file_path` parameter and uploads them to a GitLab project. Combined, any unauthenticated network-reachable attacker can read `/proc/self/environ` to steal the server&amp;#39;s `GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN` and achieve full GitLab account takeover. This is the default configuration for Docker deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two issues chain together:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. No authentication on SSE transport (`src/index.ts:7350-7388`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `SSE=true` (the intended mode for Docker deployments per `docker-compose.yaml`), the `/sse` and `/messages` endpoints have zero authentication middleware. Any HTTP client that can reach the port can establish a session and invoke all ~100+ tools using the server&amp;#39;s configured PAT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
// src/index.ts:7354 — no auth check
app.get(&amp;#34;/sse&amp;#34;, async (_: Request, res: Response) =&amp;gt; {
    const serverInstance = createServer();
    const transport = new SSEServerTransport(&amp;#34;/messages&amp;#34;, res);
    await serverInstance.connect(transport);
});
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Remote Authorization (`REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION=true`) is explicitly incompatible with SSE mode (`src/index.ts:1833-1839`), so there is no way to add per-request auth in this transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Arbitrary file read in `upload_markdown` (`src/index.ts:5461-5503`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `upload_markdown` tool calls `fs.readFileSync(filePath)` where `file…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @zereight/mcp-gitlab&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSE transport mode (`SSE=true`) exposes all MCP tools without any authentication. The `upload_markdown` tool reads arbitrary files from the server&amp;#39;s local filesystem via an unsanitized `file_path` parameter and uploads them to a GitLab project. Combined, any unauthenticated network-reachable attacker can read `/proc/self/environ` to steal the server&amp;#39;s `GITLAB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN` and achieve full GitLab account takeover. This is the default configuration for Docker deployments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two issues chain together:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. No authentication on SSE transport (`src/index.ts:7350-7388`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `SSE=true` (the intended mode for Docker deployments per `docker-compose.yaml`), the `/sse` and `/messages` endpoints have zero authentication middleware. Any HTTP client that can reach the port can establish a session and invoke all ~100+ tools using the server&amp;#39;s configured PAT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
// src/index.ts:7354 — no auth check
app.get(&amp;#34;/sse&amp;#34;, async (_: Request, res: Response) =&amp;gt; {
    const serverInstance = createServer();
    const transport = new SSEServerTransport(&amp;#34;/messages&amp;#34;, res);
    await serverInstance.connect(transport);
});
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Remote Authorization (`REMOTE_AUTHORIZATION=true`) is explicitly incompatible with SSE mode (`src/index.ts:1833-1839`), so there is no way to add per-request auth in this transport.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Arbitrary file read in `upload_markdown` (`src/index.ts:5461-5503`)**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `upload_markdown` tool calls `fs.readFileSync(filePath)` where `file…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cv3r-c5h8-f4g5</guid>
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