https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:57:09 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339262 EUVD-2026-339262 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-339262 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59891 <p>sigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 0.7.1, getRegistryCredentials() reads credentials from the Docker config file and selects an entry by checking whether any configured auth key contains the target registry string. Because this is a substring match rather than an exact host match, credentials configured for one registry can be selected for and transmitted to a different registry whose hostname has a substring relationship with a configured auth key. This issue is fixed in version 0.7.1.</p> <p>sigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 0.7.1, getRegistryCredentials() reads credentials from the Docker config file and selects an entry by checking whether any configured auth key contains the target registry string. Because this is a substring match rather than an exact host match, credentials configured for one registry can be selected for and transmitted to a different registry whose hostname has a substring relationship with a configured auth key. This issue is fixed in version 0.7.1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59891 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pf56-329r-95rw <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @sigstore/oci</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>This is a credential-exposure / credential-confusion issue.</p> <p>`getRegistryCredentials()` reads credentials from the Docker config file (`~/.docker/config.json`) and selects an entry by checking whether any configured auth key **contains** the target registry string:</p> <p>```js Object.keys(dockerConfig.auths || {}).find((key) =&gt; key.includes(registry)) ```</p> <p>Because this is a **substring match rather than an exact host match**, credentials configured for one registry can be selected for — and transmitted to — a *different* registry whose hostname has a substring relationship with a configured auth key (for example, an attacker-controlled `cr.io` matches a configured `ghcr.io`).</p> <p>**Who is impacted:** Any consumer of `@sigstore/oci` that uploads artifacts to an OCI registry using credentials from a Docker config, where the destination registry/image reference can be influenced by an untrusted party. This includes `@actions/attest` and the `actions/attest`, `actions/attest-build-provenance`, and `actions/attest-sbom` GitHub Actions when run with `push-to-registry: true`, where the `subject-name` input determines the destination registry.</p> <p>This is classified as a **critical** vulnerability given the potential, in a theoretical worst-case scenario, to expose long-lived registry credentials. However, in practice, exploitation requires all of the following:</p> <p>- The Docker config on the host contains credentials for a registry. - The destination registry/image reference is influ…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @sigstore/oci</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>This is a credential-exposure / credential-confusion issue.</p> <p>`getRegistryCredentials()` reads credentials from the Docker config file (`~/.docker/config.json`) and selects an entry by checking whether any configured auth key **contains** the target registry string:</p> <p>```js Object.keys(dockerConfig.auths || {}).find((key) =&gt; key.includes(registry)) ```</p> <p>Because this is a **substring match rather than an exact host match**, credentials configured for one registry can be selected for — and transmitted to — a *different* registry whose hostname has a substring relationship with a configured auth key (for example, an attacker-controlled `cr.io` matches a configured `ghcr.io`).</p> <p>**Who is impacted:** Any consumer of `@sigstore/oci` that uploads artifacts to an OCI registry using credentials from a Docker config, where the destination registry/image reference can be influenced by an untrusted party. This includes `@actions/attest` and the `actions/attest`, `actions/attest-build-provenance`, and `actions/attest-sbom` GitHub Actions when run with `push-to-registry: true`, where the `subject-name` input determines the destination registry.</p> <p>This is classified as a **critical** vulnerability given the potential, in a theoretical worst-case scenario, to expose long-lived registry credentials. However, in practice, exploitation requires all of the following:</p> <p>- The Docker config on the host contains credentials for a registry. - The destination registry/image reference is influ…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pf56-329r-95rw