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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354321</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354321</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354321</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354321</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-59866</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59866</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota emitted x-ms-kiota-info clientClassName and clientNamespaceName values without identifier or path sanitization as both generated client class or namespace names and generated output path components when `kiota generate` ran without -c/--class-name, allowing an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description to write generated source outside the -o output directory and inject arbitrary text into generated class or namespace declarations. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5 by GenerationConfiguration.SanitizeClientClassName and SanitizeClientNamespaceName.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota emitted x-ms-kiota-info clientClassName and clientNamespaceName values without identifier or path sanitization as both generated client class or namespace names and generated output path components when `kiota generate` ran without -c/--class-name, allowing an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description to write generated source outside the -o output directory and inject arbitrary text into generated class or namespace declarations. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5 by GenerationConfiguration.SanitizeClientClassName and SanitizeClientNamespaceName.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59866</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4vv7-jj25-4gh6 — Microsoft Kiota: Arbitrary file write + code-injection via x-ms-kiota-info clientClassName and clientNamespaceName</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4vv7-jj25-4gh6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota, NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Microsoft Kiota emitted the `x-ms-kiota-info` extension&amp;#39;s `clientClassName` or `clientNamespaceName` value
**raw**, with no identifier or path sanitization, as **both** the generated client&amp;#39;s class/namespace name
**and** part of the generated output path. When `kiota generate` is run **without `-c/--class-name`** — the
zero-config workflow that `x-ms-kiota-info` is explicitly designed for (the API provider supplies the names in
the description so consumers don&amp;#39;t have to) — an attacker who controls or tampers with the OpenAPI description
could therefore:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **(CWE-22) write the generated source file to a path outside the `-o` output directory** — e.g.
  `clientClassName: &amp;#34;/var/www/html/shell&amp;#34;`; and
- **(CWE-94) inject arbitrary text into the generated class/namespace declaration**, corrupting the generated
  client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed on Kiota **1.32.4** (the self-contained `linux-x64` release binary), i.e. **after** the earlier
writer-sink hardening — that fix escaped property/enum/default/serialization sinks but never sanitized the
provider-supplied `clientClassName` / `clientNamespaceName`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`clientClassName` reached two unsanitized sinks (observed in the generated C#; the same raw emission occurred
for Java, Go, TypeScript, Python, and PHP):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
# output FILENAME (CWE-22): clientClassName flows into the file path
clientClassName: &amp;#34;/abs/path/PWNED&amp;#34;   -&amp;gt;   /abs/path/PWNED.cs   (written outside -o)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# class declaration (CWE-94): clientClassName flows verba…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota, NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Microsoft Kiota emitted the `x-ms-kiota-info` extension&amp;#39;s `clientClassName` or `clientNamespaceName` value
**raw**, with no identifier or path sanitization, as **both** the generated client&amp;#39;s class/namespace name
**and** part of the generated output path. When `kiota generate` is run **without `-c/--class-name`** — the
zero-config workflow that `x-ms-kiota-info` is explicitly designed for (the API provider supplies the names in
the description so consumers don&amp;#39;t have to) — an attacker who controls or tampers with the OpenAPI description
could therefore:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **(CWE-22) write the generated source file to a path outside the `-o` output directory** — e.g.
  `clientClassName: &amp;#34;/var/www/html/shell&amp;#34;`; and
- **(CWE-94) inject arbitrary text into the generated class/namespace declaration**, corrupting the generated
  client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed on Kiota **1.32.4** (the self-contained `linux-x64` release binary), i.e. **after** the earlier
writer-sink hardening — that fix escaped property/enum/default/serialization sinks but never sanitized the
provider-supplied `clientClassName` / `clientNamespaceName`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`clientClassName` reached two unsanitized sinks (observed in the generated C#; the same raw emission occurred
for Java, Go, TypeScript, Python, and PHP):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
# output FILENAME (CWE-22): clientClassName flows into the file path
clientClassName: &amp;#34;/abs/path/PWNED&amp;#34;   -&amp;gt;   /abs/path/PWNED.cs   (written outside -o)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# class declaration (CWE-94): clientClassName flows verba…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4vv7-jj25-4gh6</guid>
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