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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-354318</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354318</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-354318</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354318</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-59863</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59863</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota honored a poisoned .kiota/workspace.json workspace configuration without validating per-client or per-plugin outputPath values during kiota client generate and kiota plugin generate, allowing a malicious repository or pull request to use absolute paths, rooted POSIX / paths, UNC \\ or // paths, Windows drive X:\ paths, or .. traversal segments to write generated client files outside the workspace root on a developer or CI host. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Kiota is an OpenAPI based HTTP Client code generator. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.32.5, Kiota honored a poisoned .kiota/workspace.json workspace configuration without validating per-client or per-plugin outputPath values during kiota client generate and kiota plugin generate, allowing a malicious repository or pull request to use absolute paths, rooted POSIX / paths, UNC \\ or // paths, Windows drive X:\ paths, or .. traversal segments to write generated client files outside the workspace root on a developer or CI host. This issue is fixed in version 1.29.1 and 1.32.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59863</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4rj6-vrwv-wr8m — Microsoft Kiota Workspace-config poisoning: out-of-repo file write + generation-time SSRF</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4rj6-vrwv-wr8m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota, NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Microsoft Kiota honors a poisoned `.kiota/workspace.json` — the workspace configuration that Kiota&amp;#39;s
documented team workflow has developers commit to their repository — **unvalidated** on
`kiota client generate` / `kiota plugin generate`. A repository (or pull request) containing a malicious
per-client / per-plugin `outputPath` causes Kiota, when a developer or CI runs the documented regenerate
command, to **(CWE-22) write the entire generated client to an arbitrary path outside the workspace** — the
`outputPath` was not confined to the workspace root and absolute paths were accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed on Kiota **1.32.4** (`KIOTA_CONFIG_PREVIEW=true`, the self-contained `linux-x64` release binary).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```jsonc
// .kiota/workspace.json (committed to the repo)
&amp;#34;clients&amp;#34;: { &amp;#34;MyClient&amp;#34;: {
   &amp;#34;outputPath&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;/abs/path/outside/repo/pwned_client&amp;#34;   // -&amp;gt; generated client written here (CWE-22)
}}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Running `kiota client generate --client-name MyClient` in the repo writes `MyClient.cs`,
`P/PRequestBuilder.cs`, … to the attacker-chosen `outputPath` (verified outside the working tree).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Note on `descriptionLocation`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The per-consumer `descriptionLocation` is intentionally fetched at generation time — this is how Kiota knows
where to pull an updated description from when refreshing a client, the same way any other value in a
committed lock/config file is honored. It is **not** treated as a vulnerability and is unchanged; only
`outputPath` is now confined.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### I…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota, NuGet: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Microsoft Kiota honors a poisoned `.kiota/workspace.json` — the workspace configuration that Kiota&amp;#39;s
documented team workflow has developers commit to their repository — **unvalidated** on
`kiota client generate` / `kiota plugin generate`. A repository (or pull request) containing a malicious
per-client / per-plugin `outputPath` causes Kiota, when a developer or CI runs the documented regenerate
command, to **(CWE-22) write the entire generated client to an arbitrary path outside the workspace** — the
`outputPath` was not confined to the workspace root and absolute paths were accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed on Kiota **1.32.4** (`KIOTA_CONFIG_PREVIEW=true`, the self-contained `linux-x64` release binary).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```jsonc
// .kiota/workspace.json (committed to the repo)
&amp;#34;clients&amp;#34;: { &amp;#34;MyClient&amp;#34;: {
   &amp;#34;outputPath&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;/abs/path/outside/repo/pwned_client&amp;#34;   // -&amp;gt; generated client written here (CWE-22)
}}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Running `kiota client generate --client-name MyClient` in the repo writes `MyClient.cs`,
`P/PRequestBuilder.cs`, … to the attacker-chosen `outputPath` (verified outside the working tree).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Note on `descriptionLocation`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The per-consumer `descriptionLocation` is intentionally fetched at generation time — this is how Kiota knows
where to pull an updated description from when refreshing a client, the same way any other value in a
committed lock/config file is honored. It is **not** treated as a vulnerability and is unchanged; only
`outputPath` is now confined.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### I…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4rj6-vrwv-wr8m</guid>
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