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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-383146</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383146</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-383146</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383146</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-59357</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59357</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient verification of data authenticity (CWE-345) in the external OIDC login callback in Cloud Foundry UAA v4.5.0 to v79.6.0 (inclusive) allows an authenticated UAA user to bypass the OAuth authorization-code exchange and establish an authenticated external-OIDC browser session, via submitting a UAA access token or a cross-client ID token as the callback’s id_token parameter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only manifests when a UAA zone is configured with an OIDC identity provider whose issuer exactly matches that zone’s own /oauth/token endpoint (a “self-UAA” OIDC configuration). In this configuration, the callback takes a supplied id_token directly instead of requiring the authorization code exchange, and does not verify that the token was actually issued as an ID token for the specific self-OIDC relying-party client. An attacker holding any valid UAA JWT for themselves — including a plain access token with only uaa.user scope, or a valid ID token issued to an unrelated client such as cf — can present it as the callback’s id_token and be authenticated into a mapped local (“shadow”) account. Because the resulting session is not verified against the originating token’s true audience or user_id, its effective privilege depends entirely on the shadow account’s group memberships, which can include administrative scopes such as clients.write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a valid UAA user JWT, a valid browser login state for the target zone, and the presence of a self-referential OIDC provider…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient verification of data authenticity (CWE-345) in the external OIDC login callback in Cloud Foundry UAA v4.5.0 to v79.6.0 (inclusive) allows an authenticated UAA user to bypass the OAuth authorization-code exchange and establish an authenticated external-OIDC browser session, via submitting a UAA access token or a cross-client ID token as the callback’s id_token parameter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only manifests when a UAA zone is configured with an OIDC identity provider whose issuer exactly matches that zone’s own /oauth/token endpoint (a “self-UAA” OIDC configuration). In this configuration, the callback takes a supplied id_token directly instead of requiring the authorization code exchange, and does not verify that the token was actually issued as an ID token for the specific self-OIDC relying-party client. An attacker holding any valid UAA JWT for themselves — including a plain access token with only uaa.user scope, or a valid ID token issued to an unrelated client such as cf — can present it as the callback’s id_token and be authenticated into a mapped local (“shadow”) account. Because the resulting session is not verified against the originating token’s true audience or user_id, its effective privilege depends entirely on the shadow account’s group memberships, which can include administrative scopes such as clients.write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a valid UAA user JWT, a valid browser login state for the target zone, and the presence of a self-referential OIDC provider…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59357</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9cjx-f7j2-23c5</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9cjx-f7j2-23c5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient verification of data authenticity (CWE-345) in the external OIDC login callback in Cloud Foundry UAA v4.5.0 to v79.6.0 (inclusive) allows an authenticated UAA user to bypass the OAuth authorization-code exchange and establish an authenticated external-OIDC browser session, via submitting a UAA access token or a cross-client ID token as the callback’s id_token parameter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only manifests when a UAA zone is configured with an OIDC identity provider whose issuer exactly matches that zone’s own /oauth/token endpoint (a “self-UAA” OIDC configuration). In this configuration, the callback takes a supplied id_token directly instead of requiring the authorization code exchange, and does not verify that the token was actually issued as an ID token for the specific self-OIDC relying-party client. An attacker holding any valid UAA JWT for themselves — including a plain access token with only uaa.user scope, or a valid ID token issued to an unrelated client such as cf — can present it as the callback’s id_token and be authenticated into a mapped local (“shadow”) account. Because the resulting session is not verified against the originating token’s true audience or user_id, its effective privilege depends entirely on the shadow account’s group memberships, which can include administrative scopes such as clients.write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a valid UAA user JWT, a valid browser login state for the target zone, and the presence of a self-referential OIDC provider…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Insufficient verification of data authenticity (CWE-345) in the external OIDC login callback in Cloud Foundry UAA v4.5.0 to v79.6.0 (inclusive) allows an authenticated UAA user to bypass the OAuth authorization-code exchange and establish an authenticated external-OIDC browser session, via submitting a UAA access token or a cross-client ID token as the callback’s id_token parameter.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only manifests when a UAA zone is configured with an OIDC identity provider whose issuer exactly matches that zone’s own /oauth/token endpoint (a “self-UAA” OIDC configuration). In this configuration, the callback takes a supplied id_token directly instead of requiring the authorization code exchange, and does not verify that the token was actually issued as an ID token for the specific self-OIDC relying-party client. An attacker holding any valid UAA JWT for themselves — including a plain access token with only uaa.user scope, or a valid ID token issued to an unrelated client such as cf — can present it as the callback’s id_token and be authenticated into a mapped local (“shadow”) account. Because the resulting session is not verified against the originating token’s true audience or user_id, its effective privilege depends entirely on the shadow account’s group memberships, which can include administrative scopes such as clients.write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires a valid UAA user JWT, a valid browser login state for the target zone, and the presence of a self-referential OIDC provider…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9cjx-f7j2-23c5</guid>
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