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EUVD-2026-339005

fkie_cve-2026-58484

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup's `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest's `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `"path": "/"`) is now inert.

GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96 — Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning

Affected: npm: network-ai

### Summary `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup's `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest's `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`.

An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. Confirmed in Network-AI 5.12.1.

### Details `listBackups()` trusts manifest content from disk:

```ts for (const name of readdirSync(backupsDir)) { const manifest = join(backupsDir, name, '_manifest.json'); if (existsSync(manifest)) { try { const entry = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifest, 'utf-8')) as BackupEntry; entries.push(entry); } catch { /* corrupt manifest, skip */ } } } ```

`pruneBackups()` uses the attacker-controlled `entry.path` as the deletion target:

```ts const toDelete = all.slice(keep); let deleted = 0; for (const entry of toDelete) { try { rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true }); deleted++; } catch { /* ignore */ } } ```

Default CLI reachability exists through `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>`.

Affected source evidence:

- `lib/env-manager.ts:505-523` — reads trusted backup entries from `_manifest.json`. - `lib/env-manager.ts:529-541` — rec…