https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 06:09:03 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335481 EUVD-2026-335481 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-335481 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58198 <p>ChatterBot is a machine learning, conversational dialog engine for creating chat bots. Prior to 1.2.14, UbuntuCorpusTrainer.extract() uses a predictable home-rooted output directory (~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs) with a check-then-create pattern followed by tar.extractall(path=self.data_path), allowing a local attacker who pre-plants a symlink at the predictable path to cause archive contents to be written through the symlink to an attacker-chosen directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.</p> <p>ChatterBot is a machine learning, conversational dialog engine for creating chat bots. Prior to 1.2.14, UbuntuCorpusTrainer.extract() uses a predictable home-rooted output directory (~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs) with a check-then-create pattern followed by tar.extractall(path=self.data_path), allowing a local attacker who pre-plants a symlink at the predictable path to cause archive contents to be written through the symlink to an attacker-chosen directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58198 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wvrh-2f4m-924v <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: ChatterBot</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>ChatterBot&#39;s `UbuntuCorpusTrainer.extract()` uses a predictable, home-rooted output directory (`~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs`) with a check-then-create pattern (`if not os.path.exists: os.makedirs`) followed by `tar.extractall(path=self.data_path)`. A local attacker who pre-plants a symlink at the predictable path causes `os.path.exists()` to return True (following the symlink), skipping `makedirs`, and subsequent `extractall` writes archive contents through the symlink to the attacker-chosen directory.</p> <p>The existing `safe_extract` function validates tar **member names** (zip-slip defense) but does not validate the **output directory** itself — it cannot detect that `self.data_path` is a symlink. This is the defining distinction between the archive_extraction (zip-slip) and insecure_fs_create_toctou families.</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>### Predictable output directory (line 535-546)</p> <p>```python home_directory = os.path.expanduser(&#39;~&#39;) self.data_directory = kwargs.get( &#39;ubuntu_corpus_data_directory&#39;, os.path.join(home_directory, &#39;ubuntu_data&#39;) # ~/ubuntu_data — predictable ) self.data_path = os.path.join( self.data_directory, &#39;ubuntu_dialogs&#39; # ~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs ) ```</p> <p>### Check-then-create (line 621-622)</p> <p>```python def extract(self, file_path: str): if not os.path.exists(self.data_path): # ← follows symlink → True → skips makedirs os.makedirs(self.data_path) # ← never reached if symlink exists ```</p> <p>### Extra…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: ChatterBot</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>ChatterBot&#39;s `UbuntuCorpusTrainer.extract()` uses a predictable, home-rooted output directory (`~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs`) with a check-then-create pattern (`if not os.path.exists: os.makedirs`) followed by `tar.extractall(path=self.data_path)`. A local attacker who pre-plants a symlink at the predictable path causes `os.path.exists()` to return True (following the symlink), skipping `makedirs`, and subsequent `extractall` writes archive contents through the symlink to the attacker-chosen directory.</p> <p>The existing `safe_extract` function validates tar **member names** (zip-slip defense) but does not validate the **output directory** itself — it cannot detect that `self.data_path` is a symlink. This is the defining distinction between the archive_extraction (zip-slip) and insecure_fs_create_toctou families.</p> <p>## Vulnerability Details</p> <p>### Predictable output directory (line 535-546)</p> <p>```python home_directory = os.path.expanduser(&#39;~&#39;) self.data_directory = kwargs.get( &#39;ubuntu_corpus_data_directory&#39;, os.path.join(home_directory, &#39;ubuntu_data&#39;) # ~/ubuntu_data — predictable ) self.data_path = os.path.join( self.data_directory, &#39;ubuntu_dialogs&#39; # ~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs ) ```</p> <p>### Check-then-create (line 621-622)</p> <p>```python def extract(self, file_path: str): if not os.path.exists(self.data_path): # ← follows symlink → True → skips makedirs os.makedirs(self.data_path) # ← never reached if symlink exists ```</p> <p>### Extra…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wvrh-2f4m-924v