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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 10:23:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-368841</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368841</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-368841</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368841</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-57586</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57586</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable&amp;#39;s content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim&amp;#39;s operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable&amp;#39;s content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim&amp;#39;s operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57586</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wg5p-8h9p-3mr7 — agent-coderag: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wg5p-8h9p-3mr7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: agent-coderag&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`agent-coderag` unconditionally executes a repository-controlled `gradlew` script during its default `sync` dependency-discovery flow. An attacker who can induce a victim to index a malicious Gradle repository (one containing `build.gradle` and a crafted `gradlew`) achieves arbitrary code execution with the victim&amp;#39;s OS privileges. No authentication, no extra flags, and no elevated permissions are required; the attack fires on the default `agent-coderag sync &amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` invocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists across a four-step call chain in the `sync` command:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Entry point — `code_rag/entry/cli.py:70`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
await manager.sync_dependencies(args.path or &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`sync_dependencies()` is called unconditionally before indexing. There is no opt-in flag; any `agent-coderag sync` invocation triggers dependency discovery.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Gradle project detection — `code_rag/core/manager.py:40-47`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The presence of a `build.gradle` or `build.gradle.kts` file in the target directory is sufficient to invoke `_sync_gradle()`. No additional checks are performed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. Wrapper selection — `code_rag/core/manager.py:110-113`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
gradle_wrapper = root / (&amp;#34;gradlew.bat&amp;#34; if os.name == &amp;#34;nt&amp;#34; else &amp;#34;gradlew&amp;#34;)
gradle_bin: Optional[str] = None
if gradle_wrapper.exists():
    gradle_bin = str(gradle_wrapper.resolve())
else:
    gradle_bin = shutil.which(&amp;#34;gradle&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a repos…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: agent-coderag&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`agent-coderag` unconditionally executes a repository-controlled `gradlew` script during its default `sync` dependency-discovery flow. An attacker who can induce a victim to index a malicious Gradle repository (one containing `build.gradle` and a crafted `gradlew`) achieves arbitrary code execution with the victim&amp;#39;s OS privileges. No authentication, no extra flags, and no elevated permissions are required; the attack fires on the default `agent-coderag sync &amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` invocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists across a four-step call chain in the `sync` command:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. Entry point — `code_rag/entry/cli.py:70`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
await manager.sync_dependencies(args.path or &amp;#34;.&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`sync_dependencies()` is called unconditionally before indexing. There is no opt-in flag; any `agent-coderag sync` invocation triggers dependency discovery.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Gradle project detection — `code_rag/core/manager.py:40-47`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The presence of a `build.gradle` or `build.gradle.kts` file in the target directory is sufficient to invoke `_sync_gradle()`. No additional checks are performed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**3. Wrapper selection — `code_rag/core/manager.py:110-113`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
gradle_wrapper = root / (&amp;#34;gradlew.bat&amp;#34; if os.name == &amp;#34;nt&amp;#34; else &amp;#34;gradlew&amp;#34;)
gradle_bin: Optional[str] = None
if gradle_wrapper.exists():
    gradle_bin = str(gradle_wrapper.resolve())
else:
    gradle_bin = shutil.which(&amp;#34;gradle&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a repos…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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