EUVD-2026-368513

fkie_cve-2026-57141

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.7.2, the codeMode tool in src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts executes model-generated JavaScript with new Function() and with(sandbox), while a regular-expression blocklist can be bypassed with Function('return this')() to recover the global object and by constructing the child_process module name dynamically. An attacker who can influence the code argument can access host process capabilities, read or write files, obtain environment credentials, and execute operating-system commands with the PraisonAI process privileges. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.

GHSA-p69m-4f92-2v84 — PraisonAI: Remote Code Execution via Sandbox Escape in `codeMode` Tool

Affected: npm: praisonai

## Summary

The `codeMode` tool in `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/builtins/code-mode.ts` uses `new Function()` with a `with(sandbox)` pattern to execute LLM-generated code. The blocklist-based "sandbox" can be trivially bypassed via `Function('return this')()` to recover the global object, followed by `global.require()` with string concatenation to evade the blocklist regex. This allows full arbitrary code execution on the host system. This affects all deployments where the code-mode tool is enabled for agents. ## Details **Vulnerable code (lines 187–191):** ```typescript const fn = new Function( 'sandbox', `with (sandbox) { ${code} }` ); const result = fn(sandbox); ```

The `code` parameter comes from LLM tool call arguments (the `execute` method at line 104). Before execution, a regex-based blocklist is applied (lines 108–136):

```typescript const blockedPatterns = [ /require\s*$\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*$/, /require\s*$\s*['"]fs['"]\s*$/, /import\s+.*from\s+['"]child_process['"]/, /process\.exit/, /eval\s*\(/, ]; ```

**Three fundamental weaknesses:**

1. **`with(sandbox)` does not provide isolation.** The `with` statement in JavaScript adds an object to the scope chain but does NOT prevent accessing the global object. The sandbox object sets `process: undefined` and `require: undefined`, but these are recovered via the global scope: ```javascript const g = Function('return this')(); g.require('child_' + 'process') ```

2. **Blocklist evasion…

Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-368513

fkie_cve-2026-57141

GHSA-p69m-4f92-2v84 — PraisonAI: Remote Code Execution via Sandbox Escape in `codeMode` Tool