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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-368479</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368479</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-368479</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368479</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-57137</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57137</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, createAgentLoop() in src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts passes executable tools to generateText() before invoking the onToolCall approval callback. Because the wrapped AI SDK executes tool handlers during generation, a callback that returns false records tool_rejected only after the denied tool has already produced side effects and populated toolResults. Applications using onToolCall as a human or policy approval boundary can therefore execute rejected file, command, API, or data-modifying operations. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.4.0 until 1.7.2, createAgentLoop() in src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts passes executable tools to generateText() before invoking the onToolCall approval callback. Because the wrapped AI SDK executes tool handlers during generation, a callback that returns false records tool_rejected only after the denied tool has already produced side effects and populated toolResults. Applications using onToolCall as a human or policy approval boundary can therefore execute rejected file, command, API, or data-modifying operations. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57137</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h2w2-v7j6-xqm4 — npm PraisonAI AgentLoop onToolCall approval runs after tool execution</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2w2-v7j6-xqm4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The published npm package `praisonai` exports `createAgentLoop()`, whose `onToolCall` callback is documented and exampled as an approval hook. The implementation calls PraisonAI&amp;#39;s `generateText()` wrapper with the caller&amp;#39;s executable tools first, receives `toolResults`, and only then calls `onToolCall()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because AI SDK `generateText()` executes tools with an `execute` function as part of the generation call, `onToolCall` can deny a tool only after the sensitive side effect has already happened. PraisonAI then returns `finishReason: &amp;#34;tool_rejected&amp;#34;`, which is a false security signal: the rejected tool already ran.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PoV is deterministic and local-only. It uses mock AI SDK modules, no live model call, no API key, and no network target. The tool increments an in-memory counter rather than touching the filesystem or executing commands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts`, the public config says:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
/** On tool call callback (for approval) */
onToolCall?: (toolCall: ToolCallInfo) =&amp;gt; Promise&amp;lt;boolean&amp;gt;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The inline approval example also asks a user for approval and returns the decision:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
onToolCall: async (toolCall) =&amp;gt; {
  const approved = await askUserForApproval(toolCall);
  return approved;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, `AgentLoop.step()` calls `generateText()` with the executable tools before invoking `onToolCall`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const result = await generateText({
  model: this.config.model,
  messages: this.messages as any,
  tools: this.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The published npm package `praisonai` exports `createAgentLoop()`, whose `onToolCall` callback is documented and exampled as an approval hook. The implementation calls PraisonAI&amp;#39;s `generateText()` wrapper with the caller&amp;#39;s executable tools first, receives `toolResults`, and only then calls `onToolCall()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because AI SDK `generateText()` executes tools with an `execute` function as part of the generation call, `onToolCall` can deny a tool only after the sensitive side effect has already happened. PraisonAI then returns `finishReason: &amp;#34;tool_rejected&amp;#34;`, which is a false security signal: the rejected tool already ran.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PoV is deterministic and local-only. It uses mock AI SDK modules, no live model call, no API key, and no network target. The tool increments an in-memory counter rather than touching the filesystem or executing commands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/praisonai-ts/src/ai/agent-loop.ts`, the public config says:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
/** On tool call callback (for approval) */
onToolCall?: (toolCall: ToolCallInfo) =&amp;gt; Promise&amp;lt;boolean&amp;gt;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The inline approval example also asks a user for approval and returns the decision:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
onToolCall: async (toolCall) =&amp;gt; {
  const approved = await askUserForApproval(toolCall);
  return approved;
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, `AgentLoop.step()` calls `generateText()` with the executable tools before invoking `onToolCall`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const result = await generateText({
  model: this.config.model,
  messages: this.messages as any,
  tools: this.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2w2-v7j6-xqm4</guid>
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