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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 19:13:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-367897</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367897</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-367897</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-367897</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-57130</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57130</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py interpolates LLM-controlled from_addr, subject, and query values directly into quoted IMAP SEARCH criteria. Embedded quote, backslash, newline, or null characters can escape the intended criterion and alter IMAP operations when search_emails, reply_email, or archive_email is exposed to an agent with configured email credentials, allowing mailbox data access, modification, deletion, or connection disruption. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py interpolates LLM-controlled from_addr, subject, and query values directly into quoted IMAP SEARCH criteria. Embedded quote, backslash, newline, or null characters can escape the intended criterion and alter IMAP operations when search_emails, reply_email, or archive_email is exposed to an agent with configured email credentials, allowing mailbox data access, modification, deletion, or connection disruption. This issue is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57130</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c969-5x3p-vq3v — PraisonAI: IMAP Command Injection via Unsanitized Email Search Parameters</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c969-5x3p-vq3v</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The email search tool in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py` constructs IMAP SEARCH commands by interpolating LLM-controlled parameters (from_addr, subject, query) directly into IMAP protocol strings using f-string formatting with double-quote delimiters. An attacker who can influence the arguments to the `search_emails` or `reply_email` tool (via crafted agent prompts) can inject arbitrary IMAP commands, potentially exfiltrating email data from other folders, deleting emails, or performing other unauthorized IMAP operations.
## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code (lines 493–502):**
```python
criteria = []
if from_addr:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;FROM &amp;#34;{from_addr}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if subject:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;SUBJECT &amp;#34;{subject}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if query:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;TEXT &amp;#34;{query}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if not criteria:
    criteria.append(&amp;#34;ALL&amp;#34;)
search_str = &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(criteria)
status, data = mail.search(None, search_str)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `from_addr`, `subject`, and `query` parameters originate from LLM tool call arguments (the `search_emails` public function at line 665). These values flow through without any sanitization or escaping. The double-quote (`&amp;#34;`) characters in these parameters allow breaking out of the IMAP SEARCH quoted string context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Additional injection points:**
- Line 416: `mail.search(None, f&amp;#39;HEADER Message-ID &amp;#34;{search_id}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)`
- Line 447: Same pattern in `_smtp_reply_email`
- Line 542: Same pattern in `_smtp_archive_email`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `search_id` / `message_id` parameter in these…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The email search tool in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py` constructs IMAP SEARCH commands by interpolating LLM-controlled parameters (from_addr, subject, query) directly into IMAP protocol strings using f-string formatting with double-quote delimiters. An attacker who can influence the arguments to the `search_emails` or `reply_email` tool (via crafted agent prompts) can inject arbitrary IMAP commands, potentially exfiltrating email data from other folders, deleting emails, or performing other unauthorized IMAP operations.
## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code (lines 493–502):**
```python
criteria = []
if from_addr:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;FROM &amp;#34;{from_addr}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if subject:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;SUBJECT &amp;#34;{subject}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if query:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;TEXT &amp;#34;{query}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if not criteria:
    criteria.append(&amp;#34;ALL&amp;#34;)
search_str = &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(criteria)
status, data = mail.search(None, search_str)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `from_addr`, `subject`, and `query` parameters originate from LLM tool call arguments (the `search_emails` public function at line 665). These values flow through without any sanitization or escaping. The double-quote (`&amp;#34;`) characters in these parameters allow breaking out of the IMAP SEARCH quoted string context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Additional injection points:**
- Line 416: `mail.search(None, f&amp;#39;HEADER Message-ID &amp;#34;{search_id}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)`
- Line 447: Same pattern in `_smtp_reply_email`
- Line 542: Same pattern in `_smtp_archive_email`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `search_id` / `message_id` parameter in these…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c969-5x3p-vq3v</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3532 — PraisonAI: IMAP Command Injection via Unsanitized Email Search Parameters</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3532</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The email search tool in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py` constructs IMAP SEARCH commands by interpolating LLM-controlled parameters (from_addr, subject, query) directly into IMAP protocol strings using f-string formatting with double-quote delimiters. An attacker who can influence the arguments to the `search_emails` or `reply_email` tool (via crafted agent prompts) can inject arbitrary IMAP commands, potentially exfiltrating email data from other folders, deleting emails, or performing other unauthorized IMAP operations.
## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code (lines 493–502):**
```python
criteria = []
if from_addr:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;FROM &amp;#34;{from_addr}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if subject:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;SUBJECT &amp;#34;{subject}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if query:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;TEXT &amp;#34;{query}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if not criteria:
    criteria.append(&amp;#34;ALL&amp;#34;)
search_str = &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(criteria)
status, data = mail.search(None, search_str)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `from_addr`, `subject`, and `query` parameters originate from LLM tool call arguments (the `search_emails` public function at line 665). These values flow through without any sanitization or escaping. The double-quote (`&amp;#34;`) characters in these parameters allow breaking out of the IMAP SEARCH quoted string context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Additional injection points:**
- Line 416: `mail.search(None, f&amp;#39;HEADER Message-ID &amp;#34;{search_id}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)`
- Line 447: Same pattern in `_smtp_reply_email`
- Line 542: Same pattern in `_smtp_archive_email`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `search_id` / `message_id` parameter in these…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The email search tool in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py` constructs IMAP SEARCH commands by interpolating LLM-controlled parameters (from_addr, subject, query) directly into IMAP protocol strings using f-string formatting with double-quote delimiters. An attacker who can influence the arguments to the `search_emails` or `reply_email` tool (via crafted agent prompts) can inject arbitrary IMAP commands, potentially exfiltrating email data from other folders, deleting emails, or performing other unauthorized IMAP operations.
## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code (lines 493–502):**
```python
criteria = []
if from_addr:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;FROM &amp;#34;{from_addr}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if subject:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;SUBJECT &amp;#34;{subject}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if query:
    criteria.append(f&amp;#39;TEXT &amp;#34;{query}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)
if not criteria:
    criteria.append(&amp;#34;ALL&amp;#34;)
search_str = &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(criteria)
status, data = mail.search(None, search_str)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `from_addr`, `subject`, and `query` parameters originate from LLM tool call arguments (the `search_emails` public function at line 665). These values flow through without any sanitization or escaping. The double-quote (`&amp;#34;`) characters in these parameters allow breaking out of the IMAP SEARCH quoted string context.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Additional injection points:**
- Line 416: `mail.search(None, f&amp;#39;HEADER Message-ID &amp;#34;{search_id}&amp;#34;&amp;#39;)`
- Line 447: Same pattern in `_smtp_reply_email`
- Line 542: Same pattern in `_smtp_archive_email`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `search_id` / `message_id` parameter in these…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3532</guid>
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