https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:11:22 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338814 EUVD-2026-338814 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-338814 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57082 <p>Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl generate the MSE Diffie-Hellman private key with a non-cryptographic PRNG.</p> <p>The MSE (Message Stream Encryption) handshake derives its 160-bit Diffie-Hellman private key from Perl&#39;s rand(), a non-cryptographic drand48-class generator seeded once per process, in KeyExchange.pm. The shared secret and the RC4 keys derived from it (the SHA-1 of &#34;keyA&#34; or &#34;keyB&#34;, the shared secret, and the infohash) therefore depend entirely on a predictable PRNG. The same handshake sends, in cleartext, random padding drawn from the same rand() sequence in _random_pad, immediately after the public key and the private-key draw.</p> <p>A passive observer of the handshake recovers the PRNG state from the cleartext padding, reconstructs the private key, computes the shared secret from the peer&#39;s public key on the wire, derives the RC4 keys, and decrypts the connection, defeating the passive-observation obfuscation MSE provides.</p> <p>Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl generate the MSE Diffie-Hellman private key with a non-cryptographic PRNG.</p> <p>The MSE (Message Stream Encryption) handshake derives its 160-bit Diffie-Hellman private key from Perl&#39;s rand(), a non-cryptographic drand48-class generator seeded once per process, in KeyExchange.pm. The shared secret and the RC4 keys derived from it (the SHA-1 of &#34;keyA&#34; or &#34;keyB&#34;, the shared secret, and the infohash) therefore depend entirely on a predictable PRNG. The same handshake sends, in cleartext, random padding drawn from the same rand() sequence in _random_pad, immediately after the public key and the private-key draw.</p> <p>A passive observer of the handshake recovers the PRNG state from the cleartext padding, reconstructs the private key, computes the shared secret from the peer&#39;s public key on the wire, derives the RC4 keys, and decrypts the connection, defeating the passive-observation obfuscation MSE provides.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57082 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3x8p-9jc8-598w <p>Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl generate the MSE Diffie-Hellman private key with a non-cryptographic PRNG.</p> <p>The MSE (Message Stream Encryption) handshake derives its 160-bit Diffie-Hellman private key from Perl&#39;s rand(), a non-cryptographic drand48-class generator seeded once per process, in KeyExchange.pm. The shared secret and the RC4 keys derived from it (the SHA-1 of &#34;keyA&#34; or &#34;keyB&#34;, the shared secret, and the infohash) therefore depend entirely on a predictable PRNG. The same handshake sends, in cleartext, random padding drawn from the same rand() sequence in _random_pad, immediately after the public key and the private-key draw.</p> <p>A passive observer of the handshake recovers the PRNG state from the cleartext padding, reconstructs the private key, computes the shared secret from the peer&#39;s public key on the wire, derives the RC4 keys, and decrypts the connection, defeating the passive-observation obfuscation MSE provides.</p> <p>Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl generate the MSE Diffie-Hellman private key with a non-cryptographic PRNG.</p> <p>The MSE (Message Stream Encryption) handshake derives its 160-bit Diffie-Hellman private key from Perl&#39;s rand(), a non-cryptographic drand48-class generator seeded once per process, in KeyExchange.pm. The shared secret and the RC4 keys derived from it (the SHA-1 of &#34;keyA&#34; or &#34;keyB&#34;, the shared secret, and the infohash) therefore depend entirely on a predictable PRNG. The same handshake sends, in cleartext, random padding drawn from the same rand() sequence in _random_pad, immediately after the public key and the private-key draw.</p> <p>A passive observer of the handshake recovers the PRNG state from the cleartext padding, reconstructs the private key, computes the shared secret from the peer&#39;s public key on the wire, derives the RC4 keys, and decrypts the connection, defeating the passive-observation obfuscation MSE provides.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3x8p-9jc8-598w